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The Use and Disuse of the Magna Carta: Due 
Process, Juries, and Punishment 
Robert W. Emerson† & John W. Hardwicke†† 
 
Foreword: In Remembrance of John W. Hardwicke  
My co-author, the late John W. Hardwicke, Sr., was a most 
impressive man. Lawyer, teacher, scholar, elected official, and 
judge were just five of his many prominent, public roles.  
With a panoramic view of life far beyond what he needed for 
work, my co-author was, truly, a Renaissance man. He passionately 
explored, learned, and then shared almost anything imaginable. 
Some of this was, no doubt, his just being “a character” —always 
ready to engage in philosophical jousting, historical “what ifs,” and 
pronouncements on matters grand and small.  
A lover of word play, linguistics, and good grammar, John 
Hardwicke understood in his bones a writer’s need to use just the 
right word. Nonetheless, always looking for the broad and historical 
nature of language, he would first turn to etymology before 
synonymy. And he was continually learning, whether a new 
language (e.g., Greek, learning it on his own late in life), a new 
biography, or a new composer, composition, or performance. To my 
co-author, a meaningful life meant a life of non-stop learning. One 
learns for its own sake, even in fields where one has no professional 
goals or even a personal agenda. Consider, for example, my co-
author and his lifelong love affair with classical music. John 
Hardwicke knew more about classical music than anyone not 
fortified with a couple doctorates and a lifetime of work 
concentrating exclusively on that subject. Since he was a teenage 
boy in the 1940s buying records, John Hardwicke did not acquire or 
use his newfound knowledge for any practical purpose; he just 
learned the music, loved the music, and shared that love with others. 
 
† Huber Hurst Professor, Univ. of Florida. J.D., Harvard Law School 
†† Former Chief Administrative Law Judge, Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings. 
J.D., George Washington Univ. Law School 
 
572 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
It was this, his magnificent love of all forms of learning, that 
brought my co-author to what became our article, published herein 
(“The Use and Disuse of the Magna Carta: Due Process, Juries, and 
Punishment”). First, though, permit me to provide a brief 
biographical sketch.  Judge Hardwicke lived a very full, 
accomplished 82 years, and some attention should be paid to his bill 
of particulars, as he might have said.  
   A Biographical Sketch 
Born in Winston-Salem, North Carolina in 1927, John 
Hardwicke entered the University of North Carolina, qualifying by 
examination at age 16 in June 1943. Two years later, he commenced 
teaching Latin, English, History, and Mathematics in the North 
Carolina public schools. Armed with a UNC Bachelor’s degree, in 
1950 John Hardwicke traveled northward. He graduated from 
George Washington University Law School in 1953 and was 
admitted to the Maryland Bar that year.  After short, two-year stints 
as Assistant Counsel to the Controller of the Currency in 
Washington, D.C. and then as an Associate with the firm of Piper 
and Marbury in Baltimore, John Hardwicke served as corporate 
counsel for a large chemical company.  He continued in that role for 
over three decades. Also, from 1968 to 1990, John Hardwicke 
maintained his own law practice. Based in the City of Baltimore and 
Harford County, Maryland, he had a wide-ranging, general practice, 
but with an emphasis on corporate contract negotiations, national 
energy curtailment and supply, and environmental and product 
liability law. John Hardwicke founded the Florida Phosphate 
Council (Lakeland, Florida) in 1969 and was co-founder and 
counsel to the Maryland Industrial Group (representing industrial 
consumers of natural gas and electricity) from 1974 to 1990. 
Coexisting with his legal career was John Hardwicke’s long and 
distinguished life of service in both state and county government. 
He was elected as a Member of the Maryland House of Delegates 
from Harford County (1963–1967), and he proudly and without 
reservation had already been an early advocate of the Civil Rights 
movement in Maryland. Harford County’s voters followed up by 
electing John Hardwicke as a delegate to Maryland’s Constitutional 
Convention, 1967–68. In 1973, he sought a seat in Congress and in 
the late 1970s a nomination to be governor.  In the early 1980s, he 
was strongly considered for appointment to a U.S. District Court 
judgeship. Throughout those years, John Hardwicke did find 
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numerous successes in local politics. From 1972–74, he was an 
elected Member of the Harford County Council, and then the voters 
elected him President of the Council for three successive terms, 
from 1978 through 1990. 
By 1990, John Hardwicke, now in his sixties, already had a 
lifetime as a teacher, a lawyer, and a political leader. Yet it was that 
year—at a time in life when many retire, slow down, or at least 
review their pensions more than upcoming job prospects—that John 
Hardwicke entered a new career path. It turned out to be the pinnacle 
of his professional life when John Hardwicke secured his 
appointment by Governor William Donald Schaefer as Maryland’s 
first Chief Administrative Law Judge. In this role, he oversaw the 
creation and development of a state central hearing agency—the 
Office of Administrative Hearings—to resolve conflicts between 
citizens and the state. In 1996, Governor Parris Glendening 
appointed him to a second six-year term. By the conclusion of his 
tenure in 2002, Judge Hardwicke was recognized as the foremost 
authority on state administrative law in the United States, having 
effectively created a model for a vital state agency that was adopted 
throughout the nation.   
A prolific writer, speaker, and mentor, Judge Hardwicke 
continued to work and to serve even while in retirement. He was a 
fellow of the American Bar Association and an Officer, including 
Chair, of the ABA Judicial Division’s National Conference of the 
Administrative Law Judiciary. Judge Hardwicke testified at legal 
symposia and provided expert testimony at a Congressional hearing 
on administrative law, and he served as President of the National 
Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ), 1995-1996, 
as well as Executive Director for NAALJ from 2003 to 2006.  In 
2003, the NAALJ Board of Governors awarded Judge Hardwicke 
its highest honor for significant contributions to the field of 
administrative adjudication, the Victor J. Rosskopf Award. Finally, 
in June 2009 the Maryland State Bar Association, Administrative 
Law Section, awarded him the first Annual John W. Hardwicke 
Award for leadership, vision, and invaluable contributions to the 
field of administrative law both in Maryland and throughout the 
United States.   
Last but far from least, Judge Hardwicke served as a superlative 
educator for his entire adult life. To the end of his days, Judge 
Hardwicke remained actively engaged in delivering important 
information, meaningful reflections, and vital lessons for living a 
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purposeful life. That educational mission is a key to understanding 
the man. From his late teens and early twenties in North Carolina 
teaching high schoolers, all the way to his eighties still speaking 
before law conferences, civic assemblies, and religious 
congregations, he remained a passionate advocate for and exemplar 
of an educated society. Indeed, Judge Hardwicke was awarded a 
lifetime achievement award from Johns Hopkins University for over 
forty years of outstanding contributions as an adjunct professor of 
business law at Johns Hopkins. Furthermore, in addition to 
authoring several law review articles and an article about H.L. 
Mencken, he was my co-author of a textbook, Business Law, first 
published by Barron’s in 1987 and now in its 6thth edition.  Long 
considered a readable, even interesting text, it is studied each year 
by many thousands of business law students and businesspersons 
worldwide. 
   The Magna Carta 
Certainly, Judge Hardwicke’s was a rich life, a life well led and 
lived well. However, what gave the Judge purpose until the end of 
his life was the very thing that also resulted in his leaving behind 
unfinished business—that is, one more project in need of 
completion. And that is where I entered the picture.   
For his last few years, Judge Hardwicke worked intermittently 
on a discussion of the Magna Carta and its role in English and 
American law.  I recall several conversations about the work, and 
even some reviewing of his initial outline and a very rough draft. 
But then time itself intervened. It was the one thing that could stop 
John Hardwicke, a.k.a. Force of Nature, from continuing to read and 
write. Judge Hardwicke died on Christmas Eve, 2009. He was 
preceded in death by his beloved wife of 52 years, Mary (née Mary 
Elizabeth Bunker, 1928-2001). And he left behind many friends and 
colleagues in addition to a family that included six children, 
seventeen grandchildren and one great-grandchild (now up to nine).  
My co-author’s life certainly seems complete. Still, knowing the 
man as I do, his unfinished “symphony,” his cache of research 
books, notes, and historical accounts must have left him with a tiny 
regret over his partial, tentative Magna Carta project. Later, in the 
first months and years looking at what the great man had left behind, 
I came to realize and appreciate much more the work of historians 
trying to pick up where a prior archivist had left off. It was at first a 
daunting task. On and off, over the years, the work was arduous.  
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Though I love history, and I teach some legal history, including 
our Constitution, the Magna Carta has never been my research 
focus. I primarily write about everything related to franchise law as 
well as occasional works on comparative civil procedure. But 
minding and mining the Magna Carta became a fun task, not just to 
learn about the Great Charter, but to glean from his notes or his 
citations the major concerns of my co-author: how he thought and 
what he felt. And it became a joy to work hard taking Judge 
Hardwicke’s preliminary notes and very rough draft on the 
medieval Magna Carta and the 17th Century jurisprudence of Lord 
Coke, and then developing a much larger and different law journal 
article than what my co-author would have, with much more time, 
produced. I believe the end-product is still worthy, something my 
co-author would have approved. I added many new learning streams 
and made our joint effort empirical, based on a U.S. constitutional 
framework, and filled with at least as much or more law than 
history, as much or more theory and case law than simple 
description. 
    The Family 
   Certainly, my efforts for this article were and are a personal 
choice, not merely professional. They are much more than a desire 
to help someone, now deceased, with whom I had co-authored a 
textbook and worked on some court cases and other legal matters 
over the years.  
Full disclosure is required. My co-author, John W. Hardwicke, 
Sr., was also my father-in-law (“Dad”). Forty years ago, I married 
his youngest daughter, Heidi.   
When you marry into a family, you do not always get what you 
want.  If you are lucky, you get what you need. And, if you are really 
lucky, you get both - your needs and your desires.*  I hit the jackpot, 
both with the wife and the family! So, in a small way, working on 
this article was a way to honor the man who was, in effect, my 
second father, John W. Hardwicke, Sr.  
Surely our article is not exactly as Dad imagined the work would 
end, but I am confident he would have approved.  I know Dad would 
have heartily approved of the publisher. It is a highly felicitous 
 
* Hats off to the Rolling Stones for those classic lyrics, “You can't always get what 
you want/ But if you try sometimes you just might find/ You get what you need.” THE 
ROLLING STONES, YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT (London Records 1969). 
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coincidence, for a North Carolina native, born and raised in the Tar 
Heel state, a proud graduate of UNC, that our article is appearing in 
the flagship international law journal at the University of North 
Carolina.     
Though no one in life gets exactly what he or she expected, one 
can come away satisfied. My father-in-law certainly lived such a 
life: Patriarch of a large and talented family, professionally admired 
(even adored), blessed with a powerful mind and a strong moral 
compass, and endowed with rigorous training that cultivated, inter 
alia, crucial scholarly habits and a resolute, patient judicial 
demeanor. The latter in turn suited him as a legislator, a teacher, a 
corporate counselor, an executive, and—of course—a judge. He had 
the tools to achieve consensus, to let everyone have a chance to 
speak, to put issues in perspective, and to act as a friend. This article 
thus has some language and reasoning, particularly in the early 
historical parts, for which I give credit to my co-author’s sense of 
history as well as his hours in the library, to both his sense of 
proportion and his reasoning. Those who recognize Dad’s voice will 
certainly still hear it when they read some language about King 
John, Henry III, and Lord Coke. I believe my father-in-law was at 
my side throughout this endeavor, and so—even to this day—he has 
been a teacher, a mentor, and an inspiration. Thanks, Dad!    
    
Robert W. Emerson 
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I. Introduction 
“Every present has a past of its own.”1  Likewise, every past has 
a past of its own.  Our law’s history may be likened to a vast, 
seemingly now still sea, with the inspiration for our present rights 
often having humble origins—small swells forming ripples leading 
to waves that may crash ashore and dramatically change the legal 
landscape.  The Magna Carta2  was, and remains, a key part in this 
 
 1 R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 247 (1956).  In the Revised Edition, 
this thought receives further elaboration: “The present is composed in this way of two ideal 
elements, past and future. The present is the future of the past and of the future.”  R.G. 
COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 247 (Jan van der Dussen ed., 1994). 
 2 In this Article, “Magna Carta” refers to the formal document dated 1225 and 
printed under the name of Henry III.  However, the Magna Carta covers many subjects. 
To this day, three Caps., including the “due process” provisions of Cap. 29, are still part 
of English statute law. “Cap.” is the abbreviation of the Latin “Capital” or “Article.”  The 
basic principles of Cap. 29, as modified in the time of Edward III, are the principal interests 
of this Article and, unless the context requires otherwise, it is in that sense that we refer to 
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ebb and flow of Anglo-American history that continues to play a 
role in the legal and cultural aspects of our society.3  As a complex 
document from feudal and medieval times, the Magna Carta is best 
understood by looking at its ancient past, during thirteenth-century 
England, as well as its evolution throughout history to the time of 
Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth century.4 
The power and influence of Coke brought the Magna Carta to 
America as part of the English tradition.5  Thereafter, language from 
the Magna Carta was adopted, almost verbatim, in the U.S. 
Constitution6  and numerous state constitutions.7  It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the Magna 
Carta when interpreting the nature of the rights protected by the U.S. 
Constitution, as demonstrated both historically and currently, in 
cases both federal and state, both appellate and trial.  The legally, 
 
the Magna Carta. 
 3 Matthew Shaw, Modern America and Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/modern-america-and-magna-carta 
[https://perma.cc/YXT7-LGZ5]; JAY-Z, MAGNA CARTA HOLY GRAIL (ROC Nation LLC 
2013) (naming his certified Platinum album after the Magna Carta); The Simpsons: 
Magical History Tour (Fox television broadcast Feb. 8, 2004) (portraying one of the main 
characters, Homer, as King Henry VIII using the Magna Carta as a napkin); Dr. Who: The 
King’s Demon (BBC television broadcast Mar. 15, 1983) (involving a plot where one 
character, the Master, plots to overthrow King John to prevent the signing of the Magna 
Carta); Lawrence van Gelder, A Magna Carta for Taxi Passengers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 
1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/18/nyregion/a-magna-carta-for-taxi-passengers 
.html [https://perma.cc/EY9T-E4XZ] (dubbing a proposed Bill of Rights for taxi 
passengers as the “Magna Carta of hack hires”); Hannah Keyser; 15 Illustrious Facts 
About Magna Carta, MENTAL FLOSS (June 15, 2015) (reporting over 43,00 people applied 
for tickets to see the four surviving Magna Carta in 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/ 
article/64805/15-illustrious-facts-about-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/V68A-HP5L]. 
 4 J.C. Holt summarizes Coke’s recognition of the importance of looking to the past: 
“His aim was to call in the past in order to support his arguments about the present.”  See 
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 9 (2d ed. 1992). 
 5 See generally Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jus Tempus in the Magna Carta: The 
Sovereignty of Time in Modern Politics and Citizenship, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 463 
(2010); H.D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional 
Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1917); David W. Saxe, Teaching Magna Carta in 
American History: Land, Law, & Legacy, 43 HIST. TCHR. 329 (2010). 
 6 The Magna Carta, NAT’L ARCHIVES, (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www. 
archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/magna-carta [https://perma.cc/K6LY-9RAW] 
(noting the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution tracks language from the Magna 
Carta). 
 7 See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. 
II, § 24. 
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politically, and culturally extraordinary U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,8  offers one such example. 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the treatment of the 
Magna Carta from its adoption in England to its modern 
jurisprudence as elaborated in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  The 
Article’s overview of history and jurisprudence leads to an 
examination of American Magna Carta case law concerning due 
process, juries, and punishment. 
To facilitate our journey into jurisprudence, we may recognize 
five basic types of legal arguments, as William Huhn postulated: 
text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy analysis.9  Text is the 
primary source of law.10  An example of a text is the Constitution.11  
Within the text, a person can look at the plain meaning, the canons 
of construction, and intratextual meanings.12  Intent looks to the 
person who wrote a document, such as the founders with respect to 
the U.S. Constitution.13  For determining intent, one can look to 
previous versions of the text, words in the text itself, the history of 
the text, official comments, and contemporary commentary.14  
When making an argument based on precedent, one needs to look 
to case similarities and differences.15  Tradition arguments usually 
look to common law or the “law of the land,”16  while a policy 
 
 8 576 U.S. 644, 723 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Clause 39 of the 
1215 Magna Carta as foundation for the holding of a fundamental right to marriage under 
the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clauses). 
 9 WILLIAM HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2d ed. 2008). 
 10 Id. at 17. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 19–25. 
 13 Id. at 31. 
 14 Id. at 34–39. 
 15 HUHN, supra note 9, at 42–43. 
 16 Id. at 45.  Oppressed men and women have often turned to the Magna Carta for 
solace or support, no matter their own place of origin.  For example, in 1964, Nelson 
Mandela praised the Magna Carta when he was on trial in Pretoria.  Alexander Lock, 
Magna Carta in the 20th Century, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-in-the-20th-century [https://perma.cc/B7B2-G52B].  Much 
earlier in the 20th Century, the Magna Carta played an important role in the fight for 
women’s rights worldwide.  In 1911, the Magna Carta was cited in a suffragette newspaper 
to justify action against authorities.  Likewise, in 1915, a suffragette said that it was 
“expressly contrary to the Magna Carta” to deny women a right to vote.  In the 1960s in 
the Bahamas, women looked to the Magna Carta while fighting for women’s rights.  Id.  
In 2009, the Philippines passed a law known as the Magna Carta for Women.  The Magna 
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argument is unique from the other types of argument: it is the only 
form of argument that does not look to authority, but to the future, 
for confirmation.17  All five of Huhn’s types of legal argument can 
be found in this Article. 
Philip Bobbitt states that there are six types of constitutional 
arguments: historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and 
ethical.18  Historical examines the writer’s intent.19  Textual 
considers the present meaning of the words.20  Structural looks to 
“claims that a particular principle or practical result is implicit in 
the structures of government and the relationships that are created 
by the Constitution among citizens and governments.”21  Prudential 
means being “self-conscious to the reviewing institute and [the] 
need not [to] treat the merits of the particular controversy (which 
itself may or may not be constitutional), instead advocating 
particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the 
courts in a particular way.”22  Doctrinal depends upon the 
quintessential common law rule of stare decisis—23  a review of 
 
Carta of Women, Rep. Act. No. 9710 (July 28, 2008) (Phil.); Magna Carta for Philippine 
Internet Freedom, Rep. Act. No. 10175 (Sept. 12, 2012) (Phil.); see, e.g., Sofia Santelices, 
Know What Protects You: A Guide to Philippine Laws on Women, PREEN.PH (July 31, 
2019), https://preen.ph/98828/know-what-protects-you-a-guide-to-philippine-laws-on-
women [https://perma.cc/Y59C-ZJKE] (“The Magna Carta of Women or the Republic Act 
9710 conveys a framework of women’s rights, based directly on international law.  It seeks 
to eliminate discrimination through the recognition, protection, fulfillment, and promotion 
of the rights of Filipino women ⎯ especially to those that belong in the marginalized sectors 
of society.”). 
 17 HUHN, supra note 9, at 51. 
 18 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 246 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1982). 
 19 Id.  Certainly, any examination of constitutional principles in a common law nation 
must include historical analysis.  Precedent matters, and one may view the Great Charter 
itself as a type of precedent.  Indeed, the principles of the Magna Carta have played an 
influential role in the creation of national constitutional provisions as well as international 
human rights treaties.  Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: 
Preventative Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 311, 354–56 
(2001) (noting that, in emergency situations, international human rights treaties recognize 
that the scope of the right to personal liberty could be limited and determined by public 
policy; public health and safety concerns may trump individual freedom). 
 20 BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 7. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 The principle is that judges rely on previous judicial determinations when deciding 
the same points or principles of law.  Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
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precedent, both judicial and academic.24  Finally, ethical involves 
the characterization of American institutions, and the role within 
those institutions of the American people.25  We also utilize these 
six types of arguments in this Article. 
Taken in tandem with both the federal and state constitutions’ 
reliance on the Magna Carta for borrowed language, it is clear that 
to understand the role of the Magna Carta in present and future 
American jurisprudence, we must first understand its past.26  In the 
manner of Coke, Part I of this Article begins with the Magna Carta’s 
own past, throughout Anglo-American history and including the 
treatment of and impact upon the American Colonies.  The Magna 
Carta is best understood by looking at its evolution through the 
centuries. 
At the heart of the Article, the past Magna Carta is taken to the 
present.  Part II details the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
Magna Carta in its jurisprudence concerning: substantive due 
process,27  the right to a jury trial,28  and cruel and unusual 
punishment.29  The language of Clause 29 of the Magna Carta has 
provided support for the conclusion that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ protections include substantive due process 
guarantees, not only procedural guarantees.30  More importantly, 
 
2014). 
 24 BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 7. 
 25 Id. at 94. 
 26 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra Part II.A; see also infra Appendix A (listing 43 cases). 
 28 See infra Part II.B; see also infra Appendix B (listing 21 cases). 
 29 See infra Part II.C; see also infra Appendix C (listing 14 cases); Planned 
Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 33 (Tenn. 2000) (describing the 
origins of the Due Process Clauses and the Constitution’s “law of the land” clause in the 
Magna Carta’s Clause 29 “per legem terrae” clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
196 (1968) (discussing Magna Carta’s Clause 39 foundations for the modern jury trial); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 816 (2010) (referencing the Magna Carta’s 
influence in the development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); McClenskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (“The Constitution was framed fundamentally as a 
bulwark against governmental power, and preventing the arbitrary administration of 
punishment is a basic ideal of any society that purports to be governed by the rule of law.”); 
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989) (analyzing 
petitioners’ argument that the Excessive Fines Clause developed from the “use and abuse 
of ‘amercements’” prior to the Magna Carta). 
 30 The Due Process Clause has a substantive component is firmly established through 
case law.  See generally, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding 
prohibition of contraceptive devices violated protected privacy rights under the penumbra 
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future citation to the Magna Carta is likely to encompass historical 
discussions of the meaning of the terms “life, liberty, or property.”31  
As for its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
cited to the Magna Carta as the foundation of the right to a jury 
trial.32  Finally, the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis may rely 
on the Magna Carta as embodying a proportionality principle 
toward penalties, especially fines and allegedly excessive liability 
awards33  and the case law thereof.34 
We come to see that the Magna Carta, as currently imagined, 
invoked, and employed, speaks to these issues35  as much as any 
others.36  Finally, the Appendix provides data about Supreme Court 
cases that cite the Magna Carta.37  Overall, the Article shows how 
 
of the first, third, and fourth amendments); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (finding parents have a liberty interest in controlling the education of their 
children). 
 31 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (discussing the Magna Carta in 
reference to the protection of individuals from “arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (discussing the role of the 
Magna Carta in due process as a safeguard against arbitrary government action); Cty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (citing Hurtado and further discussing the Magna 
Carta’s influence on due process).  See generally Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 
U.S. 748 (2005) (discussing the relation between an individual’s property interest, 
restraining orders, and due process). 
 32 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 816. 
 33 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 293–96 (1989) 
(discussing the Magna Carta’s development of the principle of proportionality and the 
principles relation to fines under the Eighth Amendment). 
 34 DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW, ANDREA MARTINEZ & ROY E. BROWNELL II, MAGNA 
CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 113 (2014). 
 35 See id. at 268–73 (discussing the Magna Carta’s influence on contemporary 
understanding of cruel and unusual punishment); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines 
Clause & Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1252–
53 (1987) (discussing the development of a standard for cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment through case law dicta). 
 36 See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 358 (2015) (discussing the 
principle of the Magna Carta which protected crops from uncompensated takings); 
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 723–25; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 818 n.4 (discussing the Magna 
Carta’s influence on the Privileges and Immunities Clause); S. Union Co. v. U.S., 567 U.S. 
343, 370 (2012) (Breyer, J. dissenting); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (discussing Magna Carta as foundation for 
religious freedom); Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 395–97 (2011) 
(discussing the origins of the right to petition). 
 37 Appendix A discusses Due Process.  Appendix B shows cases that cite the Magna 
Carta for jury trials and Appendix C shows cases that cite the Magna Carta for cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
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the Magna Carta has influenced not just our fundamental legal 
precepts but continues to inform our case law. 
II. A History of the Magna Carta 
The Magna Carta did not necessarily erect anything new.38  It 
came into English history as an assertion of feudal privileges and 
liberties that existed before the Norman Conquest39  and were also 
outlined in numerous charters throughout medieval Europe.40  
Generally, these charters guaranteed justice from monarchs, lords, 
and other leaders.41  The charters were contracts, and as such, 
required mutuality: protection, fairness, and justice from the lord, as 
well as loyalty, respect, and service from the vassal.42  A breach by 
either party dissolved the contract and freed the other from the 
mutual obligation.43  The Magna Carta did not arise by plan; it arose 
by impulse from a series of medieval charters that created a political 
principle akin to the rule of law.44 
The Norman invasion and conquest of England45  was the start 
 
 38 See, e.g., 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 172 (London, Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 
1898) (“[T]he charter contains little that is absolutely new.  It is restorative.  John in these 
last years has been breaking the law; therefore the law must be defined and set in writing.”). 
 39 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 35 (explaining that the Magna Carta affirmed grants of 
feudal privileges that barons, knights, and townsfolk had long since come to expect). 
 40 See generally Cary J. Nederman, The Liberty of the Church and the Road to 
Runnymede: John of Salisbury and the Intellectual Foundations of the Magna Carta, 43 
PS: POLI. SCI. & POL. 457, 457–61 (2010). 
 41 Holt explains that these medieval charters “were the natural reaction of feudal 
societies to monarchical importunity.”  See HOLT, supra note 4, at 27. 
 42 See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 451 (2d ed. 1962) (“Vassal homage was a 
genuine contract and a bilateral one. If the lord failed to fulfill his engagements, he lost his 
rights.”). 
 43 See id. 
 44 Nederman, supra note 40, at 457–61; see Michael Steenson, Roots of 
Constitutional Government: Magna Carta at 800, 72 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 18, 21 (2015) 
(“Magna Carta was initially intended to constrain John’s abuses of power, but as to a select 
group of his subjects.  The notion that power is subject to the rule of law evolved from its 
limited application in 1215 to a concept--a tailor-made argument--that power must be 
subject to limits.”). 
 45 The story of the Norman invasion and conquest of England begins with the story 
of Edward the Confessor. Edward the Confessor ruled England from 1042 to 1066.  Still 
unmarried by the age of forty, he had no designated successor. Thereafter, a conflict 
developed over who would become the next King.  There were four claimants to the throne 
and William the Conqueror was one of them.  See 3 J. B. BURRY, THE CAMBRIDGE 
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of a new chapter in England’s history.  After the Battle of Hastings 
in 1066, William the Conqueror became the first Norman king of 
England (William I), and he sought to earn legitimacy by claiming 
to be an heir to Edward the Confessor.46  William I and his 
successors promised to continue the liberties contained in the social 
contract, which they attributed to Edward the Confessor.47  For 
example, consider the coronation of Henry I in 1100: when William 
I’s immediate successor, his son William II, died, William I’s 
youngest son, Henry I, rather than his oldest son Robert,48  then 
became King of England. 
Consistent with feudal custom, Henry I’s coronation oath 
outlined a charter confirming to his English vassals the liberty and 
justice inherited from his royal Anglo-Saxon predecessors.49  
English kings after the time of Henry I continued to deliver similar 
promises in their coronation oaths, thereby perpetuating the Anglo-
Saxon freedoms that had extended down a long line of monarchs.50  
Indeed, much earlier, by 1086, when William I still ruled, ancient 
Anglia already had a new French aristocracy; although in place due 
to the Norman Frenchman William I’s conquest of England, this 
 
MEDIEVAL HISTORY 390–93 (1922). 
 46 Because conquest was a poor justification of title, William the Conqueror’s claim 
to the throne required that Edward the Confessor be a legitimate conduit of power.  William 
the Conqueror therefore legitimized his title by claiming to be the Confessor’s lawful heir.  
See J.C. Holt, The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: 
MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE 
OF LAW 22, 69 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993). 
 47 Although Edward the Confessor is romanticized in history as “the good king,” 
there is no evidence that Edward the Confessor promulgated any system of law of any 
historical importance.  See HOLT, supra note 4, at 121–51. 
 48 Perhaps that shows the ranking of the kingdoms. Robert remained as ruler of 
Normandy, while the more junior Henry took charge of England.  Regardless, William the 
Conqueror’s children, especially Henry and Robert, constantly sought to outdo one 
another.  In fact, Maitland suggests that if William the Conqueror had had only one son, 
the course of English history would have been entirely different.  While two of William 
the Conqueror’s sons became Kings of England (William II, from 1087 to 1100, and Henry 
I from 1100 to 1135), Robert remained on the continent and became a crusader.  
Eventually, Henry I imprisoned him. See 3 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 15 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). 
 49 See S. E. Thorne, Henry I’s Coronation Charter, Ch. 6, 93 ENG. HIST. REV. 369, 
794 (1978); Henry L. Cannon, The Character and Antecedents of the Charter of Liberties 
of Henry I, 15 AM. HIST. REV. 37, 37–46 (1909). 
 50 Holt, supra note 46, at 69 (emphasizing that concern for the antecessor was deeply 
ingrained in English law). 
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new ruling class was quick to assert the very rights held by those 
they had replaced through force of arms.51 
The prior English monarchs were treated as, in effect, the 
Norman Frenchmen’s legal forbears.52  Ever as demanding as the 
Anglo-Saxon nobility had been, these new patricians of the Norman 
realm reacted just as strongly as the former had against any 
encroaching powers exerted by their king.53  These aristocrats, of 
course, considered themselves entitled to the charter promises of 
Henry I and his successors.54 
These charter promises became their opening salvo against King 
John,55  who ruled England from 1199 to 1216.56  From the 
beginning of King John’s reign, the barons perceived him as 
devious and untrustworthy.57  The barons demanded an unequivocal 
limitation on the executive power of King John that would also bind 
all future heirs to the throne.58  At first, in his confrontation with the 
 
 51 John Hudson, Maitland and Anglo-Norman Law, in 89 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON “POLLOCK AND MAITLAND” 21, 39 (John Hudson ed., British 
Academy 1996) (“[B]y 1086 England had a new, French aristocracy.  These men brought 
their customs to England not in writing but in their heads. Prominent therein were ideas 
concerning lordship . . . Norman ideas, together with the consequences of Conquest and 
settlement, gathered more closely the elements of personal lordship, landholding, and 
jurisdiction.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 267 (explaining that some of the motives of the 
aristocrats in challenging King John may have been selfish but others were defenders of 
liberty for themselves and for the English nation as well). 
 55 King John (1167–1216) was the youngest child of Henry II (1133–1189) and 
Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122–1204).  John was the great-grandson of King Henry I, who 
ruled England from 1100 to 1135 and the great-great-grandson of William I (“William the 
Conqueror”), who ruled England from 1066 to 1087.  See Nicholas Vincent, The Origins 
of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/the-
origins-of-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/43LG-LN26]. 
 56 Holt, supra note 46, at 25 (“The movement against King John had begun with a 
cry for the confirmation of the Charter of Liberties of Henry I and the restoration of the 
laws of Edward the Confessor.”). 
 57 See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL 
ENGLAND 234–43 (1980) (“The unsavory character of John had never bred devotion or 
loyalty in the rank and file of his vassals, but generally a distrust; they felt his insatiable 
greed for money knew no bounds.”). 
 58 The agenda of the barons was allegedly drawn from ancient charters that the 
barons considered as the laws of Henry I and Edward the Confessor.  See WILLIAM S. 
MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 
WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 32 (James MacLehose & Sons 1905). 
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barons, King John was in a superior position.  That lasted until 1209, 
when John was excommunicated because of a quarrel with Pope 
Innocent III over the naming of the archbishop of Canterbury.59  By 
1212, King John had become so unpopular that an attempt had been 
made on his life.60  The following year, the king placed himself 
under the protection of Pope Innocent III61  and was declared a 
vassal of the Pope, thus owing tribute to the papacy.62  
Unfortunately for King John, a military disaster at the Battle of 
Bouvines resulted in the loss of all English holdings in France.63  
When John returned to England in the winter of 1214, the royal 
treasury had no funds.64 
Being in dire financial straits, King John parlayed for peace with 
the barons but did not succeed.65  The accumulation of unaddressed 
grievances led the barons to declare John in breach of his feudal 
 
 59 Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, Magna Carta: An Introduction, BRIT. LIBR. (July 
28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction 
[https://perma.cc/T8PH-3AVT]. 
 60 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 24–25.  The assassination attempt, influenced 
by baron and rebel Robert Fitzwalter, illustrated the growing discontent among the barons 
with King John.  See Mike Ibeji, King John and the Magna Carta, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/magna_01.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/S7AT-ERQA] (last updated Feb. 17, 2011); James Holt, John: King of 
England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-king-
of-England [https://perma.cc/B34E-KELQ] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021). 
 61 Article 61 in the 1215 version severely limited the kings’ power by establishing a 
security council that would oversee the king.  Limiting the kings’ powers the barons were 
also limiting the pope’s powers, which would obviously be unfavorable in a time when the 
church was interested in establishing its power.  Pope Innocent III annulled this version of 
the Magna Carta but then approved the later versions that did not include Article 61.  This 
shows that the intentions behind the original Magna Carta were to separate church and 
state.  See Nederman, supra note 40, at 457–61. 
 62 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 25; Katherine Har, Papal Overlordship of 




 63 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 55. 
 64 Hugh Schofield, The Most Important Battle You’ve Probably Never Heard Of, 
BBC NEWS (July 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28484146 
[https://perma.cc/5Y7D-XHQ8]. 
 65 See id. (“All [King John’s] taxation had gone to waste. He was weakened, and the 
barons saw their opportunity.”) 
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agreement.66  Thereafter, the parties prepared for war.67  The barons’ 
stance was straightforward: they sought all the ancient liberties 
derived from Edward the Confessor and those promised in accord 
with the coronation oath since the time of Henry I.68  King John 
expressed a willingness to address specific grievances; however, he 
was inconsistent and appeared willing to promise everything, but do 
nothing.69  After joint discussions, the barons and King John agreed 
to meet at Runnymede70  to resolve their differences.71 
Under oath,72  the barons and King John agreed to a document 
that confirmed medieval ancient rights and eliminated specific 
abuses attributed to King John—this document is known as the 
Magna Carta.73  In anticipation that King John would attempt to 
 
 66 See J.E.A. JOLIFFE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE 
ENGLISH SETTLEMENT TO 1485 158 (3d ed. 1954) (“The maxim that the power of a king 
who acts as a tyrant is illegitimate . . . was thus in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the 
cornerstone of legal security . . . . [W]hen refused legal redress, the aggrieved party is 
entirely within his rights in declaring his obligation of vassalage at an end, making war 
upon his lord”). 
 67 See Ibeji, supra note 60. 
 68 See MCKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 58–60. 
 69 For a detailed description of the struggle between King John and the barons, see 
Holt, supra note 46, at 22–29. 
 70 Ironically, squatters living in this area in modern times claimed a right to live there 
under the Rights Afforded to Common People in the 1215 version of the Magna Carta.  
They were evicted in recent years. Arrests Made at Runnymede ‘Magna Carta’ Squatters’ 
Eviction, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-surrey-
34269232 [https://perma.cc/BDA2-8SN9]; see also Carolyn Harris, The Charter of the 
Forest, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/the-
charter-of-the-forest/ [https://perma.cc/MAU7-ZPHX] (“The Magna Carta began the 
process of transforming the forests into common land that served the needs of 
communities.  According to the 1215 version of the Great Charter, ‘All evil customs 
relating to forests . . . are at once to be investigated in every county . . . and within forty 
days of their enquiry the evil customs are to be abolished completely and irrevocably.’  
This clause was eliminated from future reissues of Magna Carta as the Charter of the Forest 
expanded . . . . ”). 
 71 See Vincent, supra note 55. 
 72 The oral exchanges of oaths and the King’s seal, the Great Royal Seal, established 
the validity of the document. King John did not sign the Magna Carta.  In fact, there is no 
evidence that King John could even write.  See HOLT, supra note 4, at 255. 
 73 See Vincent, supra note 55.  An example of one such abuse was the absolute 
control over forest lands.  With the signing of the Magna Carta, the land was released to 
the common folk.  The Magna Carta of John (1215), 17 John 1, cl. 47 (Eng.) [hereinafter 
Magna Carta (1215)], available at English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (July 
28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation 
[https://perma.cc/AK6G-96W6]. 
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circumvent his obligations, the Magna Carta contains tightly drawn 
limitations on the executive power of the king: 
Cap. 39. No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or 
dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free customs, or 
be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor will we 
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the 
legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. 
Cap. 40. To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will 
we delay right or justice.74 
The Magna Carta was unique in that it not only affirmed ancient 
rights, but also contained provisions that protected the foundation 
of modern rights.75  Later in English history, the Magna Carta would 
serve a dual role as both foundation and statute. 
A. The Great Charter’s First Four Centuries 
Treatment of the Magna Carta has varied throughout English 
history.76  In thirteenth century courts, the “Great Charter”77  was 
invoked when, with grand principles at play, it furnished support for 
counsel’s legal arguments.78  The Magna Carta, however, fell into 
disuse in the fourteenth century once lawyers, absorbed with more 
mundane or practical concerns, found much of the document’s 
broad, ambitious language to be unwieldy.79  Still, the failure to use 
the Magna Carta, even in the face of a flagrant violation of one of 
its clauses,80  is not a testimony to its impotence.  Instead, it is a nod 
 
 74 Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 39, 40. 
 75 See generally Steven M. Richman, Magna Carta - Its Essence and Effect on 
International Law, 294 N.J. LAW. MAG. 5 (2015). 
 76 The Magna Carta has actually been altered three times.  It was first created in 1215, 
then altered in 1225, finally adopted into law in 1297.  Interestingly, in the beginning of 
its life, the Magna Carta was of little or no use to the ordinary British subject.  Despite 
such a “Great Charter,” the churches, kings, and barons were unchecked in their power.  
Breay & Harrison, supra note 59. 
 77 “Great Charter” is a translation of “Magna Carta.”  Id. 
 78 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 2 (“Lawyers have been responsible for much of Magna 
Carta’s survival and for the residual veneration of the Charter.”). 
 79 See generally id. (explaining that the Magna Carta fell into disuse primarily after 
the time of Edward I, king from 1272 to 1307, when lawyers became more interested in 
building a citizen and client practice than dealing with broad constitutional questions, 
which were rarely matters at issue). 
 80 Occasionally, the Magna Carta’s sixty-three provisions or parts are referred to as 
“chapters.”  However, given the relatively short length of a single-parchment document 
having about 3,600 words, it seems entirely more accurate to call such short provisions 
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to circumstance and practicality.  While the Magna Carta is the 
foundation of many modern-day rights, it is only foundational: what 
matters is not just the underlying principles, but what emanates 
therefrom, as its clauses have been incorporated into amendments, 
statutes, and case law.  As demonstrated later in this Article, the 
Magna Carta’s purposes are mainly restricted to explaining the 
extent of protection or the historical grounds for why protections 
exist.  It is much more practical to cite to the statutes and case law 
because of our judicial process.81  It is this Article’s goal to 
demonstrate that the Magna Carta does provide, and should 
continue to provide, substantive rights in U.S. common law. 
The following discussion begins with the treatment of the 
Magna Carta during the reign of King John’s successor, Henry III, 
a king who gave even greater standing to the charter by reaffirming 
it four times.82  The Article then studies the Magna Carta’s role 
during King Edward I’s reign, a period that saw the establishment 
of a written system of statutory law that gave practical effect to the 
Great Charter.83  Discussion thereupon proceeds in a completely 
opposition direction, to the lack of any genuine reference to the 
Magna Carta during the Tudor period, more than a century of 
English history (1485 to 1603) featuring a powerful monarchy.84  
The Magna Carta was kept on a shelf, where it gathered dust until 
picked up and revived by Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth 
 
“clauses” instead of using a word typically indicating a much more substantial length.  In 
fact, “clauses” does seem to be the usual term.  See, e.g., English Translation of Magna 
Carta, supra note 73 (referring to the divisions of the Magna Carta as clauses). 
 81 The purpose of the judiciary is to interpret the rules created by Congress and to 
determine whether an individual broke those rules.  Thus, statutes and Constitutional 
provisions will have a stronger weight than the Magna Carta’s clauses.  Secondly, 
precedent created by previous cases are binding under the principle of stare decisis. 
 82 The charter was reaffirmed in 1216, 1217, 1225, and then again in 1237.  The 1237 
affirmance was significant because King Henry had finally reached the age of adulthood.  
David Carpenter, Revival and Survival: Reissuing Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/revival-and-survival-reissuing-magna-
carta [https://perma.cc/RG73-ZD66]. 
 83 Richard H. Helmholz, The Myth of the Magna Carta Revisited, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
1475, 1480 (2016); see also Susan Crennan, Honourable Just., High Court of Austl., 
Magna Carta, Common Law Values and the Constitution, Oration at the Victoria L. Found. 
(May 21, 2014), reprinted in 39 MELB. U. L. REV. 331, 338–39 (2015) (noting that King 
Edward I referred to the Magna Carta as the “Great Charter of the Liberties”). 
 84 See infra Part I.A.iii. 
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century.85 
1. Reaffirmation but Disuse 
Historians generally agree that King John had no intention of 
abiding by the Magna Carta.86  When he died in 1216,87  a new 
opportunity was given to the charter.88  Upon King John’s passing, 
King Henry III, a mere nine years old at the time, came into power.89  
King Henry III’s counsel, William Marshal, known for unseating 
the future King Richard I, the Lionheart, from his horse in battle, 
served as the king’s regent after King John’s death.90  William also 
took charge at a crucial time in England’s history.  Just before King 
John died, the French had invaded England.91  The invasion would 
have been successful, but William was able to defeat the invader, 
King Louis, and ensure Henry took the throne.92  This, along with 
William’s other achievements provided him with a prominent status 
in 13th Century England.93 
 
 85 Carolyn Harris, The Rebirth of Magna Carta, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/the-rebirth-of-magna-carta/ [https://perma.cc/QW6L-
HK4W].  This revival is examined infra Part I.B. 
 86 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 228 (“Not all the men involved were men of good will, 
the king least of all.  Throughout, even when he sealed the Magna Carta, John had not the 
slightest intention of giving in or permanently abandoning the powers which the Angevin 
kings had come to enjoy.  He would surrender to force if he had to.”).  This lack of faith is 
demonstrated by his attempt to invalidate it a few months after signing.  Eric T. Kasper, 
The Influence of Magna Carta in Limiting Executive Power in the War on Terror, 126 POL. 
SCI. Q. 547, 550 (2011). 
 87 See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 507; NAT’L ARCHIVES, MAGNA 
CARTA TIMELINE 2, http://nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/education/magna-carta-
timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9SU-SLD7]. 
 88 It was clear that John and Pope Innocent opposed the Magna Carta.  By the time 
of John’s death, Pope Innocent had also passed.  With both of its opponents dead, the 
Magna Carta had none of its previous obstacles to overcome.  See Kasper, supra note 86, 
at 551. 
 89 King John’s successor, Henry III, ruled England from 1216 to 1272.  See POLLOCK 
& MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 507. 
 90 William Marshal - The Flower of Chivalry, MEDIEVAL WARFARE, 
http://www.medievalwarfare.info/marshal.htm [https://perma.cc/QD6K-6WWH] (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2020). 
 91 See Gavin Morgan, Guildford, the Magna Carta and the Forgotten Invasion of 
1216, SURREY LIVE, https://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/nostalgia/guildford-magna-carta-
forgotten-invasion-11446262 [https://perma.cc/8UKQ-3MA3] (last updated June 9, 
2016). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. 
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Harnessing his power and fame, Marshal reissued the Magna 
Carta twice while serving as the regent.94  Although Henry III did 
not promptly make an open commitment to the charter, the Magna 
Carta was backed by his advisors during his minor years.95  In fact, 
one of his principal advisors, Hubert de Burgh, advised him to 
confirm the Magna Carta when he was of full age.96  As soon as 
King Henry III turned eighteen years old in 1237, he confirmed the 
Magna Carta in full for the first time in English history.97  He 
reconfirmed the charter in the years 1248, 1249, and 1255 and 
demanded personal participation in the formal ceremonies to 
confirm the charter.98  Although Henry III’s bolstering the Magna 
Carta gave it great importance, the Great Charter fell out of use 
during this period.99  Ongoing disputes were solved not by reference 
to the generally accepted Magna Carta, but by changes in custom.100 
2. Perpetuation as Statute 
The Magna Carta was again given new importance during King 
Edward I’s reign when the charter became part of England’s 
statutory law.101  Edward I began a system of written statutory law102  
 
 94 Scott Alan Metzger, Magna Carta: Teaching Medieval Topics for Historical 
Significance, 43 HIST. TCHR. 345, 353 (2010); Magna Carta, HISTORY.COM, 
https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/magna-carta [https://perma.cc/FB6B-
YTT5] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019) (noting that the document was reissued in 1216, 1217, 
and 1225). 
 95 William Marshal was entrusted by King John to protect Henry III and served king 
regent after King John’s death.  The Magna Carta was reissued at least twice during his 
governance.  See William Marshall – The Flower of Chivalry, supra note 90. 
 96 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 550. 
 97 Carpenter, supra note 82. 
 98 JOLIFFE, supra note 66, at 294. 
 99 Harris, supra note 85. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id.  As Henry III’s son and heir, Edward I ruled England from 1272 to 1307.  
See David S. Bachrach, The Ecclesia Anglicana Goes to War: Prayers, Propaganda, and 
Conquest During the Reign of Edward I of England, 1272–1307, 36 ALBION 393, 393–94, 
394 n.6 (2004).  Edward I has often been called the “Justinian” of the Law of England. 
Reginald Francis Treharne, Edward I: King of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-I-king-of-England 
[https://perma.cc/WG3A-67ZV] (last updated July 3, 2020). 
 102 See Treharne, supra note 101.  Coincident with the beginning of written statutory 
law, the reign of King Edward I saw the development of a judicial institution.  See Jonathan 
Rose, The Legal Professional Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1, 34–37 (1988).  King Edward I began a formal judiciary that included the King’s 
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that gradually supplemented, but did not supplant, the common 
law.103  He assembled a group of advisers—an incipient 
parliament—that would participate with the king in statutory 
government.104  In 1295, a broad summons was issued for a “Model 
Parliament” that included bishops, earls, knights, and locals.105  The 
Model Parliament confirmed all ancient charters, including the 
Magna Carta, into statutory law.106 
Between 1331 and 1368, Parliament gave new power and 
responsibility to the Magna Carta through interpretation of its 
language.107  Parliament passed six statutes that clarified Clause 
29.108  Parliament concluded that the phrase “lawful judgment of 
peers” meant trial by jury.109  Additionally, Parliament interpreted 
the phrase “law of the land” to mean “due process of law,” which at 
the time meant procedure by original writ or indicting jury.110  
Moreover, Parliament changed the beginning phrase of Clause 29 
from “no free man” to “no free man of whatever estate or condition 
he may be.”111  There are reasons in logic and common sense that 
 
Bench, Common Pleas, and Yearbooks for recording judicial decisions.  See LYON, supra 
note 57, at 440–41, 619–22.  Additionally, legal practitioners who received training at the 
Inns of Court directly represented citizens in English Courts.  See id. at 625–28. 
 103 Mark A. Kishlansky et al., United Kingdom - Edward I (1272-1307), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/Edward 
-I-1272-1307 [https://perma.cc/R3S3-FSLT] (last updated Jan. 31, 2021); see also Rose, 
supra note 102, at 34–37. 
 104 See Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The 
Alluring Myth of Presidential Power of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. 
REV. 1, 30–31 (1998) (discussing the need behind the creation of a parliament under King 
Edward I’s reign). 
 105 J. H. Round, The House of Lords and the Model Parliament, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 
385, 395 (1915) (providing the Model Parliament date). 
 106 Metzger, supra note 94, at 354. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Holt, supra note 46, at 46–47.  “No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or 
dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or 
in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, 
excepting by a legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.  To no one will we 
sell, to none we will deny, to none we will delay right or justice.”  Id. at 16. 
 109 Id. at 61–62 (noting that, while the law progressed to include a trial by jury, it by 
no means had that interpretation in 1215). 
 110 Id. at 62. 
 111 Holt explains that the reason for the addition of the language “of whatever estate 
or condition he may be” was not to give the unfree complete access to the courts.  Instead, 
the addition of the language became necessary because the term “freeman” had become 
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explain the passage of statutes interpreting the Magna Carta.  For 
example, such statutes give the Great Charter its effect through its 
application to specific situations.  Law is not self-operating merely 
because it is on the books; it is, instead, Parliament’s interpretation 
of the Magna Carta that gave effect to the provisions contained in 
the Magna Carta. 
3. Decline Under the Tudors 
During the Tudor period, the Magna Carta fell into obscurity.112  
The House of Tudor commenced with King Henry VII in 1485 and 
marked the advent of a powerful monarchy with practically no 
reference to the Magna Carta.113  Henry VII was determined to 
consolidate the power of the monarchy by shifting power from the 
barons to himself and his Tudor successors.114  In this endeavor, 
Henry VII succeeded—he created an almost tyrannical kingship for 
Tudor powers throughout the sixteenth century.115  For example, his 
son and successor, King Henry VIII, drafted a “Statute of 
Proclamation” in 1539 which granted him the royal power to create 
any law without Parliamentary authority.116  During his early years 
as king, Henry VIII was personally admired as he worked adroitly 
with Parliament, although rarely with unanimity.117  Those personal 
 
synonymous with “franklin,” a term referring to a member of a social class that was not a 
“serf.”  See id. at 62–63. 
 112 See CHARLES BÉMONT, CHARTES DES LIBERTÉS ANGLAISES [CHARTERS OF ENGLISH 
FREEDOM] (1100–1305), xlviii–l (1892) (“Le Parlement approuva docilement les coups 
d’état politiques et religieux du XVe et du XVIe siècle, et la Grande Charte resta dans 
l’ombre.”  [“The Great Charter rested in the shade during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.”])  Id. at L. 
 113 Alexander Reginald Myers & John S. Morrill, Henry VII: King of England, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-VII-king-of-
England [https://perma.cc/D22F-JY7U] (last updated Jan. 24, 20121) (providing a 
background for Henry VII’s seizure of the throne); England in the 15th Century: Henry 
VII (1485-1509), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/United-
Kingdom/England-in-the-15th-century#ref482910 [https://perma.cc/5ZZG-7H9L ] (last 
visited July 28, 2020) (“He had to . . . develop organs of administration directly under his 
control . . . . ”). 
 114 J.R. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, A.D. 1485–1603 3 (1922) 
(“Henry VII perceived that what the English needed in his day was an efficient central 
administration controlled by a strong and wealthy house; and he set his policy steadily in 
this direction.”). 
 115 See LYON, supra note 57, at 588. 
 116 TANNER, supra note 114, at 529–30, 532–35. 
 117 See id. at 13. 
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skills proved useful but unnecessary for the king and his successors, 
even after the Statute of Proclamation was repealed upon Henry 
VIII’s death in 1547.118  In addition to the Magna Carta, Henry VIII 
also absorbed the powers of the papacy and passed the Act of 
Supremacy, which declared that he would be the leader of the 
English Church.119 
Additionally, King Henry VII exercised great power by 
expanding the scope of the crime of “treason.”120  Henry VII created 
the Star Chamber, an English court of law that was given exclusive 
control over crucial areas of criminal and civil activity.121  He then 
expanded the Treason Statute of 1351 to allow the Tudor monarchs 
to reach any action that the king, through Parliament, might deem 
threatening or potentially threatening.122  The Act of Supremacy 
would later be considered one of the most influential acts, second 
only to the Magna Carta.123  During the Tudor dynasty, “treason” 
had a very broad definition, which included “constructive 
treason.”124  Thus, violations could be determined judicially ex post 
 
 118 Indeed, long after Henry VIII’s death, “Henry VIII clauses” have continued to 
exist.  “Henry VIII clauses” are enacted and called that because power is given to a minister 
to amend or repeal primary legislation without having to look to Parliament.  For a detailed 
discussion of “Henry VIII clauses,” see generally, Dennis Morris, Henry VIII Clauses: 
Their Birth, a Late 20th Century Renaissance and a Possible 21st Century Metamorphosis, 
2007 LOOPHOLE 14 (2007). 
 119 The Act of Supremacy was in response to the Roman Catholic Church’s refusal to 
grant his divorce from Katherine of Aragon. Patrick Williams, Katherine of Aragon, 69 
HIST. REV. 36, 36–41 (2011).  These events marked the beginning of the constantly shifting 
religious landscape in England throughout the Tudor period.  See id. at 40.  In an attempt 
to muster support for his reign, King Henry VIII’s advisors created propaganda that painted 
King John’s resistance to both Pope Innocent III and to the baron’s initial Magna Carta 
proposal in a positive light, thus paralleling King John’s supposed bravery to King Henry 
VIII’s.  See id. at 39–41; see also Carole Levin, A Good Prince: King John and Early 
Tudor Propaganda, 11 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 23, 24 (1980). 
 120 Stanford E. Lehmberg, Star Chamber: 1485-1509, 24 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 189, 
195 (1961). 
 121 The court heard cases ranging from attempted murder to land tenure; it is believed 
that the majority of the cases involved allegations of riot.  Id. 
 122 See TANNER, supra note 114, at 5–6.  It is also interesting to note that this statute 
served as the foundation for the “Treason Clause” of the U.S. Constitution.  Carlton F. W. 
Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 
154 U. PENN. L. REV. 863, 869 (2006). 
 123 Larson, supra note 122, at 870. 
 124 During the sixteenth century, treason included “adhering to the king’s enemies.”  
Id. at 869.  Such a definition could include almost any political offense.  See id. at 869–
70.  As time went on, Henry VIII engaged in two areas of monarchical contests: (1) 
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facto.125  Under these circumstances, an appeal to the Magna Carta 
could be viewed as an attempt to limit the king’s power; therefore, 
such an appeal could be conceived as “treason” against the Crown. 
When Elizabeth I came to power in 1558,126  there was 
practically no reference to the Magna Carta. Elizabeth I continued 
the pattern established by Henry VII: she controlled Parliament by 
the force of her personality and tactful manipulation.127  However, 
she was capable of more direct interference than Henry VII.  For 
example, she dissolved Parliament twice, once in 1567 and again in 
1571.128  In 1593, Elizabeth I stated: “‘It is in me and my power’ (I 
speak now in her maj.’s person) ‘to call Parliaments; and it is in my 
power to end and determine the same; it is in my power to assent or 
dissent to anything done in [Parliament].’”129 
When Elizabeth I died in March 1603, the Tudor line of 
monarchs passed over to the House of Stuart.  The new monarch, 
King James I of England,130  perceived himself to be a philosopher 
 
disengagement from a series of wives who caused him much “pain,” and (2) independence 
from the Papacy because of its abusive and frequently exercised power of 
excommunication.  See Henry VIII (1509-47), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/Henry-VIII-1509-47 [https://perma.cc/H7YL-
FH42] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 125 Having retroactive force or effect: for example, under the heading of constructive 
treason, Parliament found Catherine Howard guilty of “treason” by reason of her 
“infidelity.”  Catherine Howard: Queen of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Catherine-Howard [https://perma.cc/CWB5-
6WNU] (last updated Feb. 9, 2020).  The Treason Act of 1534 hinged upon the deprivation 
of the “dignity” of the king.  See TANNER, supra note 114, at 379–80 (discussing a number 
of actions brought by Parliament to shelter or further promote the monarchy). 
 126 Stephen J. Greenblatt et al., Elizabeth I: Queen of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Elizabeth-I [https://perma.cc/4MSR-
PL4Q] (last updated Jan. 28, 2021). 
 127 Id. (“[Her image] was the result of a carefully crafted, brilliantly executed 
campaign in which the queen fashioned herself as a glittering symbol of the nation’s 
destiny.”). 
 128 Queen Elizabeth I did not dissolve Parliament during these years.  She vetoed a 
bill passed by Parliament in between 1566 and 1571. In 1576, Elizabeth I and Parliament 
finally came to an agreement on several statutes.  J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act 
and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 587 (2000). 
 129 1 WILLIAM COBBETT, COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM 
THE NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066, TO THE YEAR, 1803 889 (1806). 
 130 James VI had initially become King of Scotland in 1567 as an infant upon the 
death of his mother, Mary Queen of Scots.  ADAM NICOLSON, GOD’S SECRETARIES: THE 
MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE 3–5 (2005).  In 1603, James VI, King of Scotland, 
became James I, King of England.  Id.  His reign ushered in England’s Stuart Period (1603–
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king, whose motto was taken from the Sermon on the Mount—beati 
pacifici—blessed are the peacemakers.131  As a rex pacificus—king 
of peace—James had much work to do.132  England had been at war 
with Spain throughout much of Elizabeth I’s reign.133  Additionally, 
England often fought with other Catholic neighbors, namely France, 
and even with James’ native Scotland,134  a country despised by 
English nobility and members of both Houses of Parliament.135 
King James had a personal program for achieving peace with 
Spain and for solving disagreement over religious doctrine by a 
Biblical translation bearing his name, the King James Bible.136  He 
sought to be a personal participant in both endeavors.137  However, 
James I’s reign saw a rebellious Parliament that had long been 
subservient to the Tudor monarchs.138  During his reign, the Magna 
Carta remained in the shade, where it would remain until Edward 
Coke picked it up and used it as a powerful tool to argue against the 
pretensions of the Crown. 
B. The Magna Carta’s Renaissance 
Sir Edward Coke, one of the most revered jurists in the entire 
 
1714).  The Stuarts, The ROYAL FAMILY, https://www.royal.uk/stuarts 
[https://perma.cc/NK6G-NZWG] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 131 LEANDA DE LISLE, AFTER ELIZABETH: THE RISE OF JAMES OF SCOTLAND AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE OF ENGLAND 45 (2007). 
 132 See Pauline Croft, Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain, in 
THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES 140, 140 (Glen 
Burgess, Rowland Rymer & Jason Lawrence eds., 2006). 
 133 See id. 
 134 The alliance between Scotland and France against England became known as the 
Auld Alliance.  See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1053, 1073 (2010). 
 135 Id. at 1077 (“The Scottish Parliament made clear its determination to safeguard 
‘the fundamentall lawes, Ancient privilegeis, offices and liberteis of this kingdome.’ The 
Scots lawyers argued that, if the two legal systems were to be united, then the common 
law should be abandoned . . . Scotland continued to be ruled by King James VI of Scotland 
and the Scottish Parliament; England was ruled by King James I of England and the 
English Parliament.”). 
 136 NICOLSON, supra note 130, at 3–5. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See David Mathew, James I: King of England and Scotland, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-I-king-of-England-and-Scotla 
nd#accordion-article-history [https://perma.cc/3VYK-B8DS] (last updated Dec. 22, 
2020). 
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history of the common law,139  was responsible for the Magna 
Carta’s renaissance in the early seventeenth century.  Coke is an 
iconic figure in the history of liberty—“iconic” in the sense that so 
great was his stature that his writing was sufficient authority for its 
own truth or historicity.140  He turned his hand to every aspect of 
law: advocate, judge, councilor, prosecutor, and parliamentarian.141  
A core premise of Coke’s jurisprudence is that liberty can be 
achieved only through the law’s supremacy as defined in the Magna 
Carta and the ancient common law of England.142  Coke asserted 
that the liberties protected in the Magna Carta were beyond the 
reach of the Stuart kings.143  Unsurprisingly, Coke became the focal 
point of opposition to the Stuart kings. 
Supporters of the Stuart Kings argued that the liberties 
contained in the Magna Carta did not form part of the common law; 
instead, they argued that the liberties were statutory in nature and, 
therefore, subject to repeal and modification.144  Their reasoning 
was that only events prior to the coronation of Richard I on 
September 3, 1189 were meant to be treated as ancient times that 
 
 139 There is a bas-relief of Sir Edward Coke barring King James I from the court on 
the bronze door of the U.S. Supreme Court; there is another bas-relief of King John being 
forced to sign the Magna Carta by the Barons on the door as well.  OFF.  OF THE CURATOR, 
SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., THE BRONZE DOORS: INFORMATION SHEET 2, http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/about/bronzedoors.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFF-9XRF].  Of the eight 
panes on the bronze door, three depict scenes from British legal history: one of King John’s 
signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, one of the publishing of the Westminster Statute in 
1275, and finally, the scene of Sir Edward Coke and King James I.  See id. at 1–2. 
 140 See generally Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, 
Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994) (discussing Coke’s relation to English Law and 
historicism); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
551 (2006) (discussing Coke’s role in developing the common law theory). 
 141 Early in his career, Coke became regarded the pre-eminent lawyer in England.  He 
found consistent favor with the popular Elizabeth I and remained the King’s Man into the 
first years of King James I.  As a speaker of the Crown, he became Speaker of the House 
of Commons in 1593 and was named Attorney General the following year.  As the King’s 
Attorney, it was his lot to be the chief prosecutor of the Gunpowder conspirators in 1603 
and Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason.  See ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND 
THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 40–67 (2003). 
 142 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: 
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 
585, 598–600 (2009); see also JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 347 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 143 Gedicks, supra note 142, at 598–600. 
 144 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 14. 
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would form part of the common law.145  It followed, therefore, that 
because the Magna Carta was established after 1189, the cutoff date 
would exclude the protections of the Magna Carta from the common 
law.  However, the liberties contained in the Magna Carta would in 
fact form part of the common law because the liberties were not 
created in 1215.  Instead, the rights protected and affirmed by the 
Magna Carta dated to times “immemorial”; this may have inspired 
the language of the United States Declaration of Independence.146 
Coke placed the authority of the common law—and thus the 
Magna Carta—unequivocally above the actions of the Parliament 
and the Crown. Take, for example, the Semayne’s case.147  In that 
situation, Coke restricted the reach of the court and king in 
confronting the “general warrant,” which was a dangerously broad 
document.148  By likening a man’s home to a “castle or fortress” 
(truly an inspiration for future legislation and rights), Coke 
proposed that a man in his home should be safe from such general 
warrants.149  In Fuller’s Case,150  Coke ruled that the king could not 
 
 145 See Richard H. Helmholz, John Hudson, The Formation of the English Common 
Law: Law and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (1996), 29 
ALBION 461, 461 (1997) (book review) (noting the long-held view, from Maitland to the 
present, that “formation of the basic patterns of English law occurred during the reign of 
Henry II”).  More recent scholarship has added nuance, but has still not displaced the vital 
role generally ascribed to that reign from 1154 to 1189.  See generally JOHN HUDSON, THE 
FORMATION OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE 
NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA (David Bates ed., Routledge 2014) (arguing that 
the common law essentially formed in that essential time from 1066 to the end of Henry 
II’s reign). 
 146 See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION AND OTHER POLITICAL 
ESSAYS 348 (1920) (“Even in the ‘Great Charter,’ the notion of new enactments was 
secondary, it was a great mixture of old and new; it was a sort of compact defining what 
was doubtful in floating custom, and was re-enacted over and over again, as boundaries 
are perambulated once a year, and rights and claims tending to desuetude thereby made 
patent and cleared of new obstructions.”); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
 147 Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a. 
 148 These warrants did not mention a person, place, or evidence for which to be 
searched.  See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1181, 1208 (2016). 
 149 Id. 
 150 For a description of the Fuller case, see RENE A. WORMSER, THE LAW: THE STORY 
OF LAWMAKERS, AND THE LAW WE HAVE LIVED BY, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT DAY 288 (1949). 
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decide common law issues; instead, the courts had the exclusive 
responsibility for making such decisions.151  Coke and his 
colleagues successfully reinvigorated the English common law and 
effectively established it as the supreme law of the land - the English 
Constitution.152  His judgment in Bonham’s Case153  is perhaps his 
most influential.  There, Coke stated that judicial review could be 
required of actions of both Parliament and the Crown.154  Although 
Coke appears to have acknowledged that the common law was a 
form of positive law, he was careful to place the power of altering 
it in the hands of judicial officers.155 
C. The Great Charter in the American Colonies 
The Magna Carta was brought to the American colonies as part 
of the English common law.156  English settlement in America began 
in 1606 with James I’s granting of the first Virginia charter.157  In 
the Virginia charter, the king, in addition to claiming the right to 
colonize the New World, also asserted the colonists’ entitlement to 
the same rights possessed by Englishmen in the homeland.158  
 
 151 See Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke: English Jurist, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke [https://perma.cc/ 
MVT5-EUCH] (last updated Jan. 28, 2021) (quoting Coke, “[T]he king in his own person 
cannot adjudge any case”). 
 152 See id.; DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE 
LAWS 195 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (stating that the court ruled only judges may 
construe the statutes of England and its letters patent). 
 153 Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646; 8 Co. Rep. 114 a; Bonham’s Case, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Bonhams-Case [https:/ 
/perma.cc/2EKC-D9NP] (last updated Nov. 21, 2013). 
 154 See Richard H. Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of 
Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 327 (2009) (noting the Bonham case is the 
“fountainhead of the doctrine of judicial review”); Charles M. Gray, Bonham’s Case 
Reviewed, 116 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 35, 35 (1972). 
 155 At the time, it was known that judges had less authority to change the law than 
Parliament.  Parliament’s laws were supreme.  Thus, the idea of questioning a Parliament 
created law was extremely uncommon.  See Helmholz, supra note 154, at 330. 
 156 Many colonial charters in the early 1600s promised the “liberties, franchises, and 
immunities” of an Englishman.  See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: 
MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 19–23 (1968) (noting that a plaque 
in Virginia states English common law arrived in 1607). 
 157 See id. at 19. 
 158 See Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that this principle made English 
colonization in the American colonies distinct because in ancient times the colonists of 
other countries did not have the privilege to enjoy the same constitutional rights accorded 
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Additionally, colonists were granted the power to create their own 
laws so long as those laws were not inconsistent with the laws of 
England.159 
Although colonial charters set forth the principle that the 
colonists enjoyed the rights guaranteed to them under the English 
common law and the British Constitution,160  the colonists 
recognized the need to set forth their own rights in their colonial 
statutes. John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony, recognized the need to have a general law like the Magna 
Carta.  He explained: 
The deputies having conceived great danger to our State in regard 
that our magistrates for want of positive law in many cases might 
proceed according to their discretion, it was agreed that some men 
should be appointed to frame a body of grounds of law, in 
resemblance to a Magna Carta, which being allowed by some of 
the ministers and the General Court, should be received for 
fundamental laws.161 
 
to them under the legal system of their home country). 
 159 See id. at 8.  For an example, see R.I. ACTS AND ORDERS of 1647, § 4. 
 160 Whether rights under the British Constitution extended as equally to colonists as 
to subjects residing in Britain was and still is debatable, along with other issues (e.g., 
parliamentary jurisdiction and the power of the Crown in America) rendered moot once 
the colonies won their independence.  See DAVID AMMERMAN, IN THE COMMON CAUSE: 
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COERCIVE ACTS OF 1774 53–61 (1974) (explaining the 
consensus among most American politicians and advocates was that Parliament exercised 
no right of control over colonial affairs, such as trade); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 192 (1923) (noting that by 
the time of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 Americans had moved beyond 
claiming their rights as the King’s subjects and protesting allegedly unlawful actions of 
Parliament; these Americans were now revolutionaries with grievances against the King, 
basing their arguments not as much on supposedly unconstitutional statutes enacted in 
Britain, but on the executive’s (i.e., the King’s) violations of the colonists’ natural rights).  
In effect, the proto-revolutionaries’ position by the early-to-mid 1770s had to be that the 
colonists should have rights similar to those in the homeland, not that they already had 
them.  As summarized by Professor Ammerman: “[T]hat King and Parliament [] claim[ed] 
the absolute dependency of the colonies on the British government, brought the colonists 
first to dismantle the supremacy of Parliament on constitutional grounds and then to 
rebuild it on the natural rights of compact and consent[.]”  David Ammerman, The British 
Constitution and the American Revolution: A Failure of Precedent, 17 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 473, 475 (1976).  By that point in time (circa 1776), these Americans wanted their 
own completely independent government – their own “parliament” and any other 
governing structures (e.g., an executive and a judiciary) not answerable to superior 
authorities in London.  See id. at 473–76. 
 161 Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 10. 
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Soon after, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties was adopted.162  
It was the first legal code in the colonies, and it took language 
directly from the Magna Carta.163  A few years earlier, in 1638, 
Maryland passed a bill that King Charles I ultimately rejected, a bill 
recognizing the Magna Carta as a part of the law of the colony.164 
Other colonies followed suit in taking language from the Magna 
Carta and incorporating it into their own statutes.  For example, in 
1647, Rhode Island passed a law incorporating Clause 39 of the 
2015 Magna Carta165  and declaring that the “law of the land” phrase 
did not refer to the law of England; instead, the Rhode Island law 
asserted that the phrase referred to the law that the Rhode Island 
General Assembly itself enacted.166  The Magna Carta was, 
therefore, influential not only in serving as a model for major 
colonial statutes, but by laying out the rights that American 
colonists relied upon to demand relief from the Crown.167 
In addition to serving as a model for colonial statutes, the Magna 
Carta also served as a model for early state constitutions.168  For 
 
 162 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408, 435 (2010). 
 163 MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES of 1641, para. 1 (“No mans life shall be taken away, no 
mans honour or good name shall be stayned . . . unless it be by virtue or equitie of some 
expresse law . . . . ”). 
 164 MD. ACT FOR THE LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE of 1638; Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 12. 
 165 R.I. ACTS AND ORDERS of 1647, § 4. 
 166 See Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 12. 
 167 See id. at 17–18.  One may see a similar impact in other former British colonies.  
See R v. Sec’y of St. for Foreign & Commonwealth Aff. [2001] QB 1067 at 1094–95 
(Eng.) (explaining that while the Magna Carta “does not . . . curtail the sovereignty of the 
proper [colonial] lawmaker to make what laws seem fit to him[,] . . . [s]o far as it is a 
proclamation of the rule of law, [the Magna Carta] may indeed be said to follow the flag”); 
Calder v. Att’y-Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, 395 (Can.) (“[The] Magna Carta [] has 
always been considered to be the law throughout the Empire.  It was a law which followed 
the flag as England assumed jurisdiction over newly-discovered or acquired lands or 
territories.”); Irina Spector-Marks, “The Indian’s Own Magna Carta”: Britishness and 
Imperial Citizenship in Diasporic Print Culture, 1900-1914, 16 J. COLONIALISM & 
COLONIAL HIST. 1, 9 (2015) (speaking not to the later issue of independence for colonies, 
but concluding that Indians residing throughout the British Empire, 700 years after the 
Great Charter’s signing at Runnymede, asserted their rights emanating from the Magna 
Carta as a proclamation of their “imperial citizenship as both a racially neutral category 
and as steeped in British cultural, national, and racial cachet”). 
 168 See 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS 1688 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS]; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. 
CONST. art. II, § 24. 
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example, in their state constitutions, Delaware,169  North 
Carolina,170  and South Carolina171  tracked the language of the 
Magna Carta.172  As a result, the Magna Carta and English common 
law are of central relevance to courts when analyzing the original 
meaning of constitutional requirements.173  The Magna Carta has 
likewise played a role in the context of U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on substantive due process, the right to a jury trial, 
and individual protection against cruel and unusual punishment.174
  
III. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Like Coke, the U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the past—
specifically the English common law and the Magna Carta—to 
make arguments about the present.175  Historically, the Court’s 
citations to the Magna Carta have largely been cursory, something 
naturally found in many common law countries, particularly those 
with strong ties to the English crown.176  The Court has mainly cited 
 
 169 See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, §§ 10–17. 
 170 See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 12. 
 171 See S.C. CONST. of 1778, § XLI. 
 172 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 168, at 1688; see also GA. 
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; Hazeltine, 
supra note 5, at 15. 
 173 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (“[N]ot only is the 
original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the circumstances of 
its enactment, insofar as they display the particular ‘rights of English subjects’ it was 
designed to vindicate.”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169–70 (Black, J., concurring) (citing the 
Magna Carta when discussing the origin of the Due Process Clause); Kerry v. Din, 576 
U.S. 86, 91–92 (2015) (discussing the impact of the Magna Carta and Edward Coke on 
due process); Horne, 576 U.S. at 358 (referencing the Magna Carta as inspiration for the 
Takings Clause as well as the Massachusetts Body of Liberties). 
 174 The influence of the Magna Carta can also be seen when discussing the rights of 
war prisoners and habeas corpus.  Robert Pallitto, The Legacy of the Magna Carta in 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Detainees’ Rights, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 483, 483 
(2010) (referring to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush). 
 175 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169; Kerry, 576 U.S. at 91–
92; Horne, 576 U.S. at 358. 
 176 Consider Australia and New Zealand.  By the time both countries became 
independent, English common law and legislation had already exerted a strong influence.  
Australia was colonized in 1770 and received its independence in 1901.  Colonisation: 
Disposition, Disease and Direct Conflict, AUSTRALIANS TOGETHER, https://austr 
alianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/colonisation/ [https://perma.cc/MY45-
CDQG] (last updated Nov. 17, 2020); 1901: Inauguration of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, NAT’L MUSEUM AUSTL., https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-
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to the charter to affirm that rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution are long-standing and date back to at least 1215; many 
of the rights protected and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution align 
with those present in the Magna Carta.177  The intent of the framers 
of the Constitution is frequently at issue when interpreting the plain 
meaning thereof, and the close parallelism of the U.S. Constitution 
to the Magna Carta commands a consideration of the charter’s 
framed intent.  The most in-depth treatment of the Magna Carta is 
largely found in concurring and dissenting opinions when a justice 
makes a historical argument to narrow the scope of rights—it is 
from these concurring and dissenting opinions that the seeds of new 
interpretations of law and laws themselves spring.  A recent 
example of this category of citations is Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion in the 2015 same-sex marriage case, Obergefell v. 
Hodges.178 
Overall, the Magna Carta continues to play a fundamental role 
in courts’ decisions involving fundamental rights and liberties.179  
As new judges are appointed to courts and as new claims or theories 
are advanced, new rights can be discovered in the documents, such 
as the Magna Carta.180  Indeed, in just the first five and a half months 
 
moments/resources/federation [https://perma.cc/MCG9-TQZK] (last updated Sept. 9, 
2020).  New Zealand was brought into the British Colonies in 1840 and received its 
independence in 1907.  Steve Watters, History of New Zealand 1769-1914, N.Z. HIST., 
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/history-of-new-zealand-1769-1914 
[https://perma.cc/97QF-7LY7] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).  A natural jurisprudential 
development, therefore, is that in Australia and New Zealand, the Magna Carta is one of 
the most cited documents by both litigants and judges.  See David Clark, Icon of Liberty: 
Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australia and New Zealand Law, 24 MELB. U.L. REV. 
866, 866, 868 (2000).  Despite its heavy historical influence, the Magna Carta is little used 
for practical purposes in these jurisdictions.  Id. at 868.  By now, the rights it professed are 
codified, so the Magna Carta often is used for sentiment in those two nations and to serve 
as a connection between modernity and the early development of modern rights.  Id.  
Because it is so commonly cited, the Magna Carta is in jeopardy of becoming a truism 
when courts or other decision makers assert its fundamental liberties. 
 177 For a list of cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has cited to the Magna Carta and 
the nature of the treatment in each case, see infra Appendices A, B, and C. 
 178 576 U.S. at 721–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the formulation of life, 
liberty, and property as well as the origin and meaning of due process); the Magna Carta 
was later discussed in Breyer’s dissent in the case Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 
861 (2018). 
 179 See Justin Fisher, Why Magna Carta Still Matters Today, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/why-magna-carta-still-matters-today 
[https://perma.cc/9P97-X6Y6]. 
 180 See, e.g., Joshua Rozenburg, Magna Carta in the Modern Age, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 
604 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
of 2020, twenty-seven courts had already cited the Magna Carta in 
justification for their decisions.  According to a search on Westlaw 
on June 13, 2020, since 1956, there have been at least 238 state 
appeals court opinions and 344 state supreme court opinions 
referring to the historic Magna Carta, with such opinions found in 
all fifty states as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.  
Likewise, the same search showed that there have been 183 U.S. 
Court of Appeals opinions since 1921 referring to the Magna Carta, 
with 101 of those opinions mentioning due process, thirteen 
discussing the right to jury trial, and nineteen commenting on cruel 
and unusual punishment.  As for U.S. District Courts, the same 
search showed that they have referred to the Magna Carts in 290 
opinions since 1960.  Both in the states and in the federal courts, 
and at all levels and across jurisdictions, the trend is toward more 
referencing of the Magna Carta.181 
The rights granted by the Magna Carta include freedom of 
petition, due process, just compensation for takings, freedom from 
excessive bail or fines, no cruel or unusual punishment, speedy 
trials, public trials for criminal cases, the ability to confront one’s 
accusers, and access to a trial by an impartial jury for criminal 
charges.182  Sometimes, Magna Carta references made before the 
American courts are, in effect, invocations of hoary concepts of 
liberty, as a matter of rhetoric, rather than any sort of precedent.183  
For instance, an early allusion to the protection of liberty occurred 
when John Quincy Adams used the Magna Carta’s ideas to 
successfully defend the freedom of the Amistad slaves in the 
Supreme Court.184  However, that particular argument was 
unsuccessful, and the Court instead granted the slaves their freedom 
 
13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-in-the-modern-age 
[https://perma.cc/K34E-KGWL] (noting that a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court case traced its 
reasoning on a habeas corpus ruling for foreign prisoners of the United States back to the 
U.S. Constitution’s provisions, which were drawn from the Magna Carta). 
 181 See Matthew Shaw, Modern America and Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/modern-america-and-magna-carta [https:// 
perma.cc/L4J9-CW4E]. 
 182 The English and Colonial Roots of the U.S. Bill of Rights, TEACHING AM. HIST., 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/bor/roots-chart/ [https://perma.cc/5QHW-
7PEF] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) [hereinafter English and Colonial Roots]. 
 183 See Ralph Turner, Magna Carta in the United States, 15 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 
6, 9–13 (2014). 
 184 Id. at 10. 
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because of their Spanish origin.185  The same argument did not work 
for Dred Scott, who was an American born slave.186  Nonetheless, 
later appeals to the Magna Carta helped further define liberty, 
illustrating that while the scope of freedom may change, its 
foundation in the Magna Carta remains.187  So, when looking at 
American courts and the Magna Carta, we see the constant conflict 
between merely rhetorical declarations and creation of case 
precedents. 
A. The Magna Carta and Substantive Due Process 
Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court cites the Magna Carta to 
support the proposition that a right in question is long-standing and 
firmly established.188  The Supreme Court’s citations in the due 
process arena—discussing procedural protections—are no 
different.  The Court has quickly cited to the Magna Carta when 
asserting that the due process guarantees are long-standing and 
ancient in origin.189  The Magna Carta has also played a substantive 
role in defining due process. As shown below, Clause 29 of the 
Magna Carta has helped the Supreme Court shape the argument that 
the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment190  and Fourteenth Amendment191  protect not only 
 
 185 Id. at 10–11. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id. at 11. 
 188 For example, the Court will refer to Magna Carta when the right to a jury trial, due 
process, etc. are involved.  See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1945) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 189 See, e.g., Malinski, 324 U.S. at 413–14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The 
safeguards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’ summarize the 
history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected 
in the constitutional development of our people”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (“Dating back to Magna Carta, however, it has been an abiding 
principle governing the lives of civilized men that ‘no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned 
or disseised [sic] or outlawed or exiled . . . without the judgment of his peers or by the law 
of the land.’”). 
 190 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “No person shall . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . ”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 191 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
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procedural guarantees,192  but substantive guarantees as well.193 
1. Linking “Law of the Land” with Due Process 
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited the “law of the land” clause194  
of Clause 29 primarily to support the argument that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses include substantive, 
as well as simply procedural components.195  The plain language of 
the Due Process Clauses guarantee procedural due process.196  
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted “due process” to cover 
much more than procedural requirements.197  When citing to the 
Magna Carta to support this proposition, the Court’s line of 
reasoning is that the Due Process Clause grew out of the “law of the 
land” provision of the Magna Carta, and the “law of the land” 
provision guaranteed substantive rights.198  Essentially, the Court 
 
 192 Guarantees of procedural due process include notice and the opportunity to be 
heard.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that “[p]rocedural due process has to do with the manner of the trial”). 
 193 Substantive due process is a principle that allows courts to protect individuals 
against arbitrary government action that hinges on their life, liberty, or property.  See 
Williams, supra note 162, at 417–18. 
 194 The “law of the land” clause (Clause 29) provides: “No freeman shall be taken, or 
imprisoned . . . . [save] by the law of the land.”  See The Magna Carta of Henry III (1225), 
9 Hen. 3, cl. 29 (Eng.) [hereinafter Magna Carta (1225)] (cl. 39 of John’s Charter of 1215), 
translated and quoted in EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWES OF ENGLAND: CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT, AND OTHER 
STATUTES 45 (E. & R. Brooke 15th ed. 1797) (1642); see also Peter Coss, Presentism and 
the ‘Myth’ of Magna Carta, 234 PAST & PRESENT 227, 229 (2017) (“No free man is to be 
arrested, or imprisoned . . . . nor will we go against him, nor will we send against him, save 
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land . . . . to no one will we deny 
or delay, right or justice.”). 
 195 See infra Appendix A for a list of U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning 
substantive due process that cite to the Magna Carta. 
 196 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[Nor shall he] be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”); id. §1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). 
 197 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Were due 
process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the 
deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating 
in the future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, 
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.”).  But see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The notion that a constitutional provision that 
guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could 
define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of 
words.”). 
 198 For a discussion on the historical meaning of the phrase “law of the land” and 
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has relied on the Magna Carta to state that the “law of the land” and 
“due process” are one and the same.199 
The Court’s linkage of the “law of the land” provision with the 
Due Process Clause is consistent with the English Parliament’s 
fourteenth century interpretation of the phrase “law of the land” as 
referring to due process.200  Additionally, this approach is consistent 
with Coke’s work in this area.201  Since the Court has firmly 
established through case law that those Due Process Clauses 
guarantee substantive due process, the Magna Carta has played a 
significant role in the Court’s analyses of the cases elaborating upon 
the 5th and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses’ guarantee of 
substantive due process. 
2. The Meaning of “Life, Liberty, and Property” 
The Court’s use of the Magna Carta has firmly established the 
existence of substantive guarantees in the Due Process Clauses, and 
 
whether the phrase was intended to cover substantive rights, see Robert E. Riggs, 
Substantive Due Process in 1791, WIS. L. REV. 941, 948–58 (1990). 
 199 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Town Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 792 n.2 (1980) 
(Blackmun J., concurring) (“It is well recognized that the Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution grew out of the ‘law of the land’ provision of the Magna Carta 
and its later manifestations in English statutory law.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378 
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Both phrases are derived from the laws of England and 
have traditionally been regarded as meaning the same thing.”); Davidson v. New Orleans, 
96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877) (“The equivalent of the phrase ‘due process of law,’ according to 
Lord Coke, is found in the words the ‘law of the land’ in the Great Charter.”); Beckwith 
v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 294–95 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that due process 
and the Magna Carta’s phrase “law of the land’ are synonymous); Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856) (explaining that “the words 
‘due process’ of law were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 
‘by the law of the land’ in Magna Charta.”). 
 200 See Coss, supra note 194, at 231 (discussing the impact of the Magna Carta being 
the “cornerstone of English liberty, law, and democracy[,]” quoting UNESCO’s 
inscription of Magna Carta in its Memory of the World Register); see also O’Bannon, 447 
U.S. at 792 n.2. 
 201 See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND; CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT AND OTHER STATUTES 50 (The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1642) (“Nisi per Legem terrae.  But by the law of the 
land.  For the true sense and exposition of these words, see the statute of 37 E. 3. cap. 8. 
where the words, by the law of the land, are rendred [sic], without due proces [sic] of Law, 
for there it is said, though it be contained in the great charter, that no man be taken, 
imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold without process of the law; that is, by indictment or 
presentment of good and lawfull [sic] men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or 
by writ original [sic] of the common law.”). 
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the Magna Carta may be of further use in defining what rights and 
interests are to be protected by substantive due process.202  Both 
Coke and Blackstone understood that the principles contained in the 
Magna Carta are capable of producing results greater than what is 
readily apparent from the text of the document.203  By using the 
Magna Carta in this manner, courts could begin to expand and 
develop rights protected by substantive due process.204  Where 
procedural due process may more readily equate to the fundamental 
legal theory found in the Magna Carta—the necessity for adequate 
legal procedures when taking away an individual’s life, liberty, or 
property—substantive due process requires the government to 
justify an infringement on freedom in order to protect against 
arbitrary exercise of power.205  In this way, substantive due process 
develops out of the Magna Carta’s legal theory.206  So also it springs 
from the Great Charter’s spirit.207 
In substantive due process cases, courts must determine whether 
an individual’s asserted interests are protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of “life, liberty, and 
 
 202 In other words, instead of limiting the Magna Carta’s use to prove simply that 
substantive rights exist, use the Magna Carta to create the specific rights. 
 203 See Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1492. 
 204 See Chantal-Aimee Doerries, Magna Carta in 2015: A View from London, 294 
N.J. LAW. MAG. 47, 48 (2015) (arguing that the Magna Carta is still relevant for developing 
rights in the United Kingdom: “The admonition of Magna Carta is not abstract.  Even 
today, 800 years later, the need for adherence to its most basic prescription of no delay or 
denial of justice can be seen”). 
 205 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 935 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2013).  
Countries such as India have adopted the principle that government cannot arbitrarily 
deprive individuals of their personal liberty.  Jinks, supra note 19, at 354–55.  Although 
this principle is widely recognized in national constitutions, in its application nations often 
disagree over the meaning of the term, “arbitrary.”  Id. at 354–56. 
 206 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Magna Carta and the Beginning of Modern Legal 
Thought, 85 MISS. L.J. 621, 641–42 (2016) (discussing the foundational role the Magna 
Carta has served in developing modern law). 
 207 See Paulette Brown, Magna Carta: A Blueprint for Rule of Law in America, 294 
N.J. LAW. MAG. 22, 22–24 (2015); William J. Brennan Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., 
Address at the Rededication of the American Bar Association’s Memorial to Magna Carta 
(July 13, 1985), in 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 55, 57 (1985) (speaking on the development of 
rights and liberties: “[T]hese liberties, taken for granted today, find their root in the spirit 
of Magna Carta.  Once it was recognized that an individual had rights against the 
government and that there was a do-main of personal autonomy and dignity in which the 
government had no right to intrude, it was only a matter of time before the full range of 
civil rights and liberties were called forth in service of the same ideal.”). 
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property.”208  Answering that question requires a court to precisely 
define “life, liberty, and property,” which is often easier said than 
done.  In defining “life, liberty, and property,” the Court looks to 
the past to determine whether the right has been protected 
historically.209  The Court’s emphasis on the past is accompanied by 
a reluctance to expand the scope of substantive guarantees; the 
reasoning underlying this reluctance is that the Court cannot push 
too far ahead as a judicial body.210 
Although the Court places great emphasis on assessing whether 
a right has been historically protected,211  the Court has recognized 
that the identification of a right “has not been reduced to any 
formula.”212  In that same vein, the Court has acknowledged that 
 
 208 For an example, consider Roe v. Wade, where the court recognized a woman’s 
interests in her pregnancy. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Those rights 
were then protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 153. 
 209 See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has 
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the . . . pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely 
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (finding fundamental 
rights which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” qualify for 
heightened scrutiny under the doctrine of “substantive due process”); Lawrence v. Texas, 
529 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Individuals are “entitled to respect for their private lives.  The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full 
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”); Obergefell, 576 
U.S. at 647 (“The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, 
and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). 
 210 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“By extending constitutional protection to 
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena 
of public debate and legislative action.  We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field’ . . . lest the liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members 
of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); 
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 
520–21 (2012) (defining theory of judicial self-restraint and discussing rationale behind 
the theory). 
 211 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On 
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2007) (explaining that many of the Court’s opinions “stress that substantive 
rights are unlikely to be protected by due process unless they are rooted in historical 
understandings”). 
 212 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. 
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while historical understandings guide the identification of a right, 
‘history and tradition’ do not set the right’s outer boundaries.213  
This approach is consistent with the idea that courts must be flexible 
when defining rights in light of changing norms and customs in 
society.214  This methodology for constitutional interpretation also 
follows the practices adopted for interpreting the Magna Carta—
that the “mind” of the document governs the interpretation, and not 
necessarily the text alone—215  this has been evinced by consistent 
expansion of the rights protected by the Magna Carta as well as 
conformity to social norms and the contemporary ideal of justice 
through statutory interpretation.216  For example, Justice Douglas, 
in his dissenting opinion in McGautha v. California, criticized the 
majority for relying on only Anglo-American law from the time of 
the Magna Carta to conclude that granting a jury unbridled 
discretion in determining guilt and punishment in a single trial did 
not violate due process requirements.217  Justice Douglas 
emphasized that due process cannot be frozen in content as of one 
 
at 542). 
 213 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that 
criminalized certain intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex as a 
violation of due process and recognizing that although history is the starting point in a 
substantive due process inquiry, it is not the ending point in all cases). 
 214 Consider the end of the “Lochner era.”  In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court 
recognized a fundamental right to contract and struck down a New York statue for limiting 
that right.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (stating the freedom of master 
and employee to contract with each other cannot be interfered with).  Then in 1937, the 
Supreme Court determined that the fundamental right to contract must be limited by 
upholding a minimum wage law for women.  See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379, 392 (1937) (“Freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right.”). This 
change was likely motivated by the increase in government control during the Great 
Depression.  Id. at 399–400. 
 215 Reading between the lines of the Magna Carta shows other meanings to the 
document.  Nicholas Vincent, A Letter of 9 July 1214 Showing King John’s Disquiet, 
MAGNA CARTA PROJECT (Sept. 2014), https://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/ 
feature_of_the_month/Sep_2014_2 [https://perma.cc/X2U4-MCC8]. 
 216 Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1490; see also Andrew T. Bodoh, The Road to “Due 
Process”: Evolving Constitutional Language from 1776 to 1789, 40 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
103, 113–14 (2018) (“A series of statutes enacted during Edward III’s reign (1327–1377) 
specified and updated the interests protected and the nature of the protections afforded 
under the Magna Carta’s law of the land and denial of justice clauses.  These statutes are 
the original link between due process language and the Magna Carta. . . . . Further, a 1363 
statute (37. Edw. 3, ch. 18) interpreted the Magna Carta as prohibiting taking or 
imprisoning a man, or putting him out of his freehold, ‘without process of the law.’”). 
 217 402 U.S. 183, 243–45 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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point in time by saying: 
[T]o hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of 
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to 
render it incapable of progress or improvement.  It would be to 
stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to 
the laws of the Medes and Persians.218 
Certainly, Justice Douglas considered the Constitution and, in 
effect, the Magna Carta, to be living documents.  While his was the 
dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas’ reasoning may, as society 
evolves, form the basis for a future majority opinion.  In light of the 
two competing views as to the weight that historical understandings 
should have when identifying rights, the Magna Carta will continue 
to play a role as a foundation for fundamental rights and liberties 
protected by the U.S. Constitution. 
The Court has cited the Magna Carta to both expand and limit 
the scope of protection that “liberty” entails.  For example, one of 
the Court’s most recent in-depth treatments of the Magna Carta that 
discusses a narrowing of the scope of “liberty” is found in Justice 
Thomas’s 2015 dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges.219  
Justice Thomas relied on William Blackstone’s interpretation of the 
Magna Carta as historical support for the proposition that the 
original meaning of the term “liberty” does not encompass the 
fundamental right to marry.220  In contrast to the dissenting Justice 
Thomas, the majority in Obergefell held that because the right to 
marriage is a fundamental right, same-sex couples cannot be 
deprived of the right to marry under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.221  Obergefell 
 
 218 Id. at 243 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529).  Some legal professionals criticize 
Douglas’s opinions because “[t]here is too much reliance upon the raw facts of life, 
generalities about human liberty and dignity . . . too much Magna Carta[.]”  Stephen B. 
Duke, Mr. Justice Douglas, 11 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 241, 241 (1976).  
Justice Douglas was known to be ahead of his time in his opinions as he was often 
criticized for basing them on moral values instead of previous court decisions.  For 
example, he wanted to desegregate school years before the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision.  He was also known for his beliefs against too much government and the 
oppression of individual rights.  David J. Garrow, The Tragedy of William O. Douglas, 
NATION (Mar. 27, 2003), https://www.thenation.com/article/tragedy-william-o-douglas/ 
[https://perma.cc/9SNH-2ETJ]. 
 219 See 576 U.S. at 720–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 220 Id. at 723–25. 
 221 Id. at 675–76, 681 (majority opinion).  “The right of same-sex couples to marry 
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that 
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examined due process, which is contained within the Magna Carta, 
and used an old right to create a new right for same-sex couples to 
marry.  When the Magna Carta was written, the writers probably did 
not think that one day the Magna Carta’s due process could be used 
to give same-sex couples the right to marry.  Justice Thomas’s 
disagreement with the majority was two-fold and dealt with both the 
Fifth Amendment222  and the Fourteenth Amendment.223 
Justice Thomas explained that his view of “liberty” is based on 
Blackstone’s interpretation of Clause 29 of the Magna Carta and 
refers only to freedom from physical restraint, and not an 
entitlement to government benefits.224  He further explained that the 
Due Process Clause dates back to the Great Charter’s Clause 29, 
which provides that “[n]o free man shall be taken imprisoned, 
disseised [sic], outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor 
will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers and by law of the land.”225  Justice Thomas 
reasoned that in discussing the “absolute rights of every 
Englishman” affirmed and codified by Clause 29,226  Blackstone 
 
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”  Id. at 672.  “[T]he right to 
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-
sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”  Id. at 675.  Other approaches to 
this analysis have also been favored.  For instance, “the Hawaii Supreme Court held 
Hawaii’s law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on 
the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.”  
Id. at 662 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1930)); see also Evan 
Gerstmann, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 17 
INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 18, 19–21 (2017) (discussing the historical role of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its application to same-sex couples). 
 222 In a case about the federal Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment (e.g., searches and seizures), the Court held “that racial segregation in the 
public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 223 First, Justice Thomas explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect substantive rights.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 722 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“By straying from the text of the Constitution, substantive due process exalts 
judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority.”).  Second, 
even if the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects substantive rights, the same-
sex couple petitioners were not deprived of the “liberty” that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects.  Id. at 725. 
 224 Id. at 721–26. 
 225 Id. at 723. 
 226 See The English and Colonial Roots of the U.S. Bill of Rights, supra note 182 and 
accompanying text (listing some basic rights whose origins trace to the Magna Carta). 
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defined “the right of personal liberty”227  as “the power of 
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to 
whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without 
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law.”228  Justice 
Thomas’s dissent illustrates the nexus of Clause 29 and 
Blackstone’s interpretation.229 
The Court has also cited the Magna Carta to broaden the scope 
of the term “liberty.”  For example, the Court has cited the Magna 
Carta to discuss and clarify the right to travel.  In Kent v. Dulles,230  
the Court ruled that the right to travel is an inherent element of 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.231  The Court explained that “[the] right was emerging 
at least as early as the Magna Carta” and cited to the Great Charter’s 
Article 42: 
It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our 
kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, 
saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some 
short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting 
prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of 
the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who 
shall be treated as it is said above.232 
The Supreme Court’s use of the Magna Carta supports the 
notion that its principles expand beyond the text itself.  Looking to 
the “mind” of the Magna Carta gives courts a larger scope of 
freedom in making decisions.233  An example can be seen in Sir 
 
 227 See infra Parts II.A, B (noting that the Magna Carta did not create substantive 
rights, but affirmed and codified rights present since “time immemorial”). 
 228 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130).  Indeed, the Magna 
Carta may be considered relevant even after 800 years, as it may foster fundamental rights.  
Eric Engle, Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment Became Illegal in 
America--A Future History, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 485, 488–93 (2008) (arguing that the 
principles established by the Magna Carta will lead to the eventual outlawing of the death 
penalty). 
 229 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din, joined by Justices Roberts and 
Thomas and decided only eleven days before Obergefell v. Hodges, reiterates the notion 
that the definition of liberty as stated by the Magna Carta is limited to physical liberties.  
This opinion rejects the argument that due process was incorrectly denied when the visa 
of the spouse of U.S. citizen was denied.  Kerry, 576 U.S. at 91–92. 
 230 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
 231 Id. at 125. 
 232 Id. at 125 n.12 (citing to the 1225 edition of the Magna Carta). 
 233 Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1490. 
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Edward Coke’s interpretation of the charter in his Institutes.234  
Although he supported the declaratory effect the Magna Carta had 
on English law and liberty, he recognized the possibility of change 
to ancient law.235  Coke interpreted the Magna Carta to promote the 
creation of amendments to existing laws.236  Further, Coke 
interpreted the principles of Magna Carta to impact a greater 
purpose in the emergence of future laws.237  The Framers of the 
Constitution had a similar understanding of the significance of the 
Magna Carta, specifically in relation to substantive due process.238  
The Constitution’s reliance on an implied meaning of the principles 
of the Charter should encourage courts to rely on this interpretation 
when exploring new rights. 
3. The Magna Carta and Protection of the Internet 
With the June 2018 repeal of Net Neutrality,239  many internet 
users—while seeking to protect their unrestrained access to the 
internet—240  have joined the campaign for a “Digital Magna Carta 
(DMC)”;241  this is the result of a 3,000 participant survey conducted 
by the British Library with the purpose of creating a top ten list of 
internet declarations.242  Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the 
 
 234 Id. at 1490–91. 
 235 Id. at 1491. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 1491–92.  Coke continued to support the idea that the principles of the Magna 
Carta should be interpreted beyond the words of the text.  For instance, Coke interpreted 
the guarantee of rights to “free men” to apply to both women and men.  See id. at 1491–
92.  The rights of these “free men” were to be protected by the Charter’s text.  See id.; see 
also Crennan, supra note 83, at 337. 
 238 See Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1475. 
 239 Alina Selyukh, FCC Takes Another Step Toward Repeal of Net Neutrality, NPR 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/22/587896608/fccs-
repeal-of-net-neutrality-on-track-to-go-into-efffect [https://perma.cc/Q9PR-MDHR]; see 
also Keith Collins, Net Neutrality Has Officially Been Repealed. Here’s How that Could 
Affect You., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/ 
technology/net-neutrality-repeal.html [https://perma.cc/S94K-TZ92]. 
 240 Alex McClintock, 8 Ways Magna Carta Still Affects Life in 2015: Net Neutrality, 
ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-15/magna-carta-800-years/6538364 
[https://perma.cc/2399-K5UD] (last updated Oct. 9, 2016). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Jamie Redman, Millennials Demand Web Freedoms in ‘Digital Magna Carta’, 
COINTELEGRAPH (June 16, 2015), https://cointelegraph.com/news/millennials-demand-
web-freedoms-in-digital-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/FA7J-HTLC]. 
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World Wide Web, has expressed his support for the DMC.243  
Broadly interpreted, this may be viewed as a reaffirmation of rights 
that have been in existence since time immemorial. The technology 
is new, but the rights are venerable, and a long-revered document 
espousing basic rights, such as the Magna Carta or the U.S. 
Constitution, may apply to internet freedom. 
This provides an interesting question with respect to how far the 
Great Charter’s protection of rights can evolve.  Certainly, 
unrestrained internet access was not contemplated by the drafters of 
either the Magna Carta or U.S. Constitution.  This begs the question: 
can the Magna Carta protect net neutrality moving forward?  The 
Magna Carta provides a due process safeguard for “liberties,” which 
can be an extremely broad term.244  This can be likened to the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), both 
inspired by the Magna Carta and both calling for a respect of one’s 
privacy.245  This right is embodied in the Magna Carta because these 
treatises represent the new natural law, which the Magna Carta must 
match.246  It is not difficult to imagine such protection when the 
internet provider might be likened to a modern day version of King 
John.  With the internet being the primary source by which 
information is currently disseminated, the danger of net neutrality 
repeal cannot be overstated.  Without neutrality, companies will 
theoretically be able to restrict which websites individuals may be 
able to access freely moving forward.247  The ultimate reality of 
which websites are accessible without a fee or amercement may 
come down to arbitrary decisions made under unbridled individual 
or institutional authority.248 
The Magna Carta’s influence on the protection of an open and 
 
 243 Id. 
 244 Magna Carta (1225), cl. 49, supra note 194 at 45. 
 245 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 
1948); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[European Convention on Human Rights] art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 246 See JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011) 
(providing an overview and introduction to natural law and its various theories); infra notes 
371–379 and accompanying text (discussing natural law and the Magna Carta). 
 247 McClintock, supra note 240.  This may also involve issues regarding First 
Amendment speech, but for the sake of this Article, the discussion is limited to “liberty” 
and the Magna Carta. 
 248 Selyukh, supra note 239. 
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neutral internet hinges on its definition as a liberty interest.  The 
Magna Carta protects human rights through its imposition of due 
process, and among those rights are the rights to freedom of 
expression, the press, and speech.  The First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution protects the right to free speech and freedom of the 
press: this is especially important in the context of free internet 
access to younger generations, who increasingly derive news 
information and communicate through social media platforms.249  In 
addition to free access to the internet being protected under Magna 
Carta due process principles and U.S. Constitution free speech 
principles, the United Nations added internet access to the 
UDHR.250  It did so by interpreting UDHR Article 19, which 
encompasses the uninhibited right to receive or disseminate 
information through any medium, as a universal human right, to 
internet access.251 
Multiple sovereigns opposed the resolution under the UDHR 
protecting free internet access, but the United States was not one of 
them.252  Though the United States did not oppose the resolution, it 
has not been motivated to strictly abide U.N. declarations and 
resolutions.253  Article 19 was made to address more extreme 
 
 249 J. Clement, Internet Usage of Millennials in the United States – Statistics & Facts, 
STATISTA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2576/us-millennials-internet-
usage-and-online-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/FT4R-KRHR] (stating that 48% of adults 
between the ages of 18 and 29 report that they are online “almost constantly”); Tim 
Berners-Lee, We Need a Magna Carta for the Internet, 31 NEW PERSP. Q. 39, 40 (2014) 
(describing the internet as a public utility); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 250 Catherine Howell & Darrell M. West, The Internet as a Human Right, BROOKINGS 
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/11/07/the-internet-as-a-
human-right/ [https://perma.cc/NC5B-X4Y7] (“Section 32 adds [to UDHR Article 19] 
‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet’ and another 15 
recommendations that cover the rights of those who work in and rely on internet access.  
It also applies to women, girls, and those heavily impacted by the digital divide.”). 
 251 UDHR Article 19 does not expressly include the word “access” but instead 
mentions the right to freely express opinions, including the right to receive and disseminate 
those opinions without interference: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 245, art. 19.  In effect, the universal right embraces a 
right to access, as declared in an interpretative, non-binding resolution.  Now, 193 U.N. 
members have signed and adopted the resolution, which marked a global shift towards 
internet access truly being recognized as a human right.  Howell & West, supra note 250. 
 252 See Howell & West, supra note 250. 
 253 That could be seen as indicated by the United States’ refusal to follow the UDHR’s 
trend of prohibiting the death penalty.  The Article certainly could be classified as merely 
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instances of internet restriction: one such U.N. report was released 
to address the total shutdown of Syria’s internet because of political 
unrest.254  It has become clear that on the international scene, the 
United States’ position is that the right to free internet access is a 
basic human right.  Domestically, however, it is not clear how far a 
U.S. citizen’s right to the internet extends when taken in comparison 
to an internet service provider’s right to profit therefrom. 
With the Federal Communication Commission’s repeal of Net 
Neutrality, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely have to confront this 
issue.  The Supreme Court has not addressed whether internet 
access is a right, only saying that overbroad restriction of the 
internet raises constitutional concerns.255  Recently, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deferred to 2005 precedent with the 
court deciding to uphold the FCC’s decision to strip neutrality rules 
from the internet, but the FCC cannot block states from writing their 
own neutrality laws.256  The public’s protection against the over-
broad restriction of the internet in many ways hearkens back to the 
due process guaranteed through the Magna Carta, as well as its 
incorporation into the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment. 
B. The Magna Carta and the Right to a Jury Trial 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the 
various rights of criminal defendants, including the rights to a trial 
by jury, to an attorney, and to a trial without unnecessary delay.257   
 
“soft law.”  Id. 
 254 Id.; Nicholas Thompson, Why Did Syria Shut Down the Internet, NEW YORKER 
(May 8, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-did-syria-shut-
down-the-internet [https://perma.cc/LBZ9-4ZEK]. 
 255 Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (holding that facially 
overbroad restrictions of internet content were in violation of the First Amendment).  But 
see United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 194 (2003) (requiring libraries to 
utilize internet filters to protect children from vulgar content as a requisite for the receipt 
of federal funding not a violation under the First Amendment). 
 256 See Nilay Patel, The Court Allowed the FCC to Kill Net Neutrality Because 
Washing Machines Can’t Make Phone Calls, VERGE (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/4/20898779/fcc-net-neutrality-court-of-appeals-
decision-ruling [https://perma.cc/C7V5-46WB].  The court declined to rehear the case on 
February 6, 2020. David Shepardson, U.S. Appeals Court Will Not Reconsider Net 
Neutrality Repeal Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2020-02-06/us-appeals-court-will-
not-reconsider-net-neutrality-repeal-case [https://perma.cc/423Z-AWNN]. 
 257 The Sixth Amendment states: 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the Magna Carta for 
historical support in interpreting these rights.  In its Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has specifically 
cited to Clause 39 of the Magna Carta, which states in relevant part: 
“[n]o free man258  shall be seized or imprisoned, . . . except by 
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”259  The 
Court has also cited to language in Clause 40 which states: “To no 
one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”260 
Much of the Magna Carta’s Clause 40 language was 
incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and 
from there into the Sixth Amendment.261  The Speedy Trial 
provision is “an important safeguard to prevent undue and 
oppressive incarceration prior to trial”262  and serves “a societal 
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from and 
at times in opposition to the interests of the accused.”263  The public 
benefit is centered around the considerable expense of supporting 
persons in jail, as well as the hardship to the accused persons’ 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 258 Freemen constituted a small percentage of the population at the time of the Magna 
Carta’s drafting; freemen were held to be tenant farmers who maintained “freehold title to 
their farms” or estates.  This definition expanded over time to include “all Englishmen (not 
women)[.]”  Magna Carta Guaranteed the Freemen of the Kingdom Their Liberties 
Forever (1215), ONLINE LIBR. OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/508 
[https://perma.cc/Y3YR-SS7X] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021); see MCKECHNIE, supra note 
58, at 114–16. 
 259 Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 39.  But see Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna 
Carta and the Right to Trial by Jury, in MAGNA CARTA: MUSE AND MENTOR 139, 146–49 
(Randy J. Holland ed., Thomson Reuters 2014) (noting that cl. 39 originally did not 
guarantee a right to a jury trial).  The fallacy will be further discussed later. 
 260 Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 40; see also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (quoting Clause 40 of the 1215 Magna Carta). 
 261 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3813 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909), as reprinted in H. Doc. 
No. 357 (2d Sess. 1909). 
 262 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
 263 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
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families; furthermore, any delay might stymie the deterrent and 
rehabilitative effects of the criminal law.264 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also cited to the Magna Carta in 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to support the proposition that the 
right to a trial by jury is a long-standing right that dates back to the 
Magna Carta.265  However, the Court later acknowledged that the 
Magna Carta itself may not have referred to a jury trial.266  As early 
as 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Blackstone in his 
Commentaries to explain that the right to a jury trial was enshrined 
in the Magna Carta.267  In 1898, in a case that has now been 
overturned, the Court asserted, “[w]hen [the] Magna Carta declared 
that no freeman should be deprived of life, etc., ‘but by the judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land,’ it referred to a trial by twelve 
jurors.”268 
1. Clause 29 
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, a plurality of the Court concluded 
that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply in juvenile 
cases.269  Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion in McKeiver cited to 
 
 264 See id.; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).  The 
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, codified the law with respect to the 
right, intending “to give effect to the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.”  S. REP. NO. 
1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1974). 
 265 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 239 (2005) (asserting that “the 
right to a jury trial [has] been enshrined since the Magna Carta”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S. 639, 711 (1990) (explaining that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial 
in criminal cases . . . carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta” 
(quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 (1968))); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 815 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (recognizing that certain basic liberties, including the right to a jury trial, 
date back to the Magna Carta). 
 266 See infra notes 273–279 and accompanying text. 
 267 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1879) (“Blackstone, in his 
Commentaries, says, ‘The right of trial by jury, or the country, is a trial by the peers of 
every Englishman, and is the grand bulwark of his liberties, and is secured to him by the 
Great Charter.’”). 
 268 See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898). 
 269 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (concluding that the right 
to a jury trial does not apply to juveniles, explaining that the Sixth Amendment rights that 
apply to juveniles, including the right to a lawyer or the right to cross-examination, are 
guaranteed to juveniles for fact-finding purposes, reasoning, however, that a jury is not a 
necessary component of accurate fact-finding, and concluding also that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial does not apply in the context of juvenile court because 
juvenile prosecution considered neither civil nor criminal). 
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the Magna Carta as historical support for the argument that the right 
to a jury trial is not limited in scope to the protection of adults.270  
Justice Douglas quoted the language of Clause 29 of the Magna 
Carta, which provides that freemen should not be imprisoned unless 
by the lawful judgment of his peers.271  Justice Douglas explained 
that like adults, juveniles also fit within the Magna Carta’s reference 
to a “freeman,” and as such should enjoy the same constitutional 
rights.272 
Despite this promising reference to the Magna Carta with 
respect to an accused’s right to a speedy trial, scholars generally 
agree that Clause 29’s mention of the phrase “judgment of his 
peers” does not refer to a jury trial.273  At the time of the Magna 
Carta’s drafting, England did not have jury trials.274  As jury trials 
began to frequently occur,275  interpreting the Magna Carta’s 
reference to “lawful judgment of his peers” to mean “trial by jury” 
served as a natural progression of the interpretation of the Magna 
Carta with changing times and legal procedures.276  As such, many 
people, including Supreme Court justices, construed “judgment of 
his peers” to equate to a right to trial by jury.277  For example, in his 
 
 270 Id. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 25, 184 n.124 (“[I]t is now generally 
admitted that the phrase iudicium parium does not point to trial by jury . . . [but rather that] 
‘No man shall be judged by his inferior who is not his peer[.]”); MCKECHNIE, supra note 
58, at 84 (“One persistent error, adopted for many centuries, and even now hard to dispel, 
is that the Great Charter guaranteed trial by jury.”); Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. 
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 917, 922 n.14 (1926) (referring to the linkage between “judgment of his 
peers” and a trial by jury as an ancient error). 
 274 See Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 
22 PUBLIUS 2, 19–20 (1992) (“Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, 
freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question [in Parliament] the 
invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain 
any one provision for the security of those rights . . . . ” (quoting James Madison for 
comparisons between the U.S. Bill of Rights and the Magna Carta)). 
 275 See Holt, supra note 46, at 62 (noting that reading “lawful judgment of his peers” 
to mean “trial by jury” is an interpretation that is a “natural and logical progression” of the 
Magna Carta but in the year 1215 did not exist). 
 276 See id. 
 277 See Justin J. Wert, With a Little Help from a Friend: Habeas Corpus and the 
Magna Carta After Runnymede, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 475, 477 (2010) (discussing that 
some scholars argue that the right to jury trial, though not explicit in the Magna Carta, 
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dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the phrase “judgment 
of his peers” in Clause 29 of the Magna Carta is a reference to a jury 
trial.278  Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
it may have been wrong in citing to the Magna Carta to forge a 
connection between Clause 29 and the right to a jury trial.279 
Historians have generally interpreted Clause 29 to set forth the 
right to a trial, though not necessarily one by jury, because jury trials 
did not exist in England at the time the Magna Carta was drafted.280  
By 1215, as long described by commentators and historians,281  
there were three types of trials in England: (1) trial by 
 
could be implied). 
 278 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 571 (recognizing that “‘[j]udgment of his peers’ is a 
term expressly borrowed from the Magna Charta, and it means a trial by jury” (citing Ex 
parte Wagner, 50 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935))). 
 279 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (1968) (explaining that it is sufficient to say that by 
the time the U.S. Constitution had been written, jury trial had been in existence in England 
for several centuries although it is disputed whether the right to a jury trial can be traced 
to the Magna Carta); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91 n.27 (1970) (acknowledging 
that whether “judgment of his peers” is a reference to a jury is a fact that historians dispute). 
 280 See, e.g., Laura Logiudice, The Never Ending Story of the Peremptory Challenge: 
Racial Discrimination in the New Jersey System, 7 SETON HALL L.J. 617, 623 (1997) 
(“Although the Magna Carta supposedly guaranteed a trial by jury, it was not until the 
Roman Catholic Church prohibited other forms of justice, and upon a writ by Henry II in 
early 1219, that criminal jury trials began to occur on a regular basis.”); MCKECHNIE, supra 
note 58, at 250 (arguing that to introduce trial by jury into the Magna Carta is an 
unpardonable anachronism because the criminal petty jury had not been invented in 1215); 
HOLT, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining that the Magna Carta’s reference to “lawful judgment 
of peers” could not have meant trial by jury because the process existed only in “embryo” 
in 1215). 
 281 Walker Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, 2 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1923) 
(explaining the three types of trials in England in 1215 and recognizing that the first 
authentic instance of a trial by jury in England occurred in the year 1351, long after the 
signing of the Magna Carta). 
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compurgation,282 (2) trial by ordeal,283  and, lastly, (3) trial by 
battle.284  Many defendants actually preferred trials by battle to the 
other forms of trials because it was the only way to avoid perjury.285 
As established, Clause 29’s reference to a “judgment of his 
peers” does not necessarily refer to a jury trial; instead, the phrase 
merely required that every judgment be delivered by the accused 
person’s equals.286  At the time of the Magna Carta’s drafting, King 
John frequently and arbitrarily seized the properties of his subjects 
without any legal process of confiscation or opportunity for the 
 
 282 Trial by compurgation involved the summoning of compurgators, specifically the 
defendant’s neighbors and friends, to swear to their belief in the truth of the claim against 
the defendant.  JOHN BRIGGS, ET. AL, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND: AN 
INTRODUCTORY HISTORY 5 (1996).  The compurgators would not swear to the truth of the 
claim in light of the evidence before them; instead, their swearing was based on their 
personal knowledge of the defendant’s reputation and the nature of the alleged offense.  
See id. at 4.  Even after the compurgators had put in their two cents, the judge ultimately 
decided the matter.  Clark, supra note 281, at 3 (“Scattered references to a trial by 
jury . . . have been shown to refer solely to trial by compurgators, which was simply the 
summoning of witnesses for either side who swore only as to their belief as to which party 
was right and the matter was decided, not by a jury as we know it, but by the judge.”). 
 283 In a trial by ordeal, the innocence or guilt of the defendant was determined through 
several unpleasant tests.  For example, in a trial by hot iron, a defendant was forced to 
carry a heated weight of iron throughout a specified distance.  If three days later, the 
defendant’s hand healed without festering, the defendant was considered innocent. Briggs 
also describes in detail other forms of trial by ordeal.  For example, a trial by consecrated 
bread was normally reserved to determine the guilt or innocence of a cleric.  The defendant 
is forced to swallow a piece of consecrated bread; if the defendant choked, the defendant 
was guilty.  See BRIGGS ET AL., supra note 282, at 5. 
 284 Trials by battle required two persons to fight to the death, often on horseback with 
sword, shield, and spear.  See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 39, 44 (explaining 
that William the Conqueror introduced trial by battle into England through “[a]n 
apparently genuine ordinance” which allowed Englishmen to choose trial by battle in their 
lawsuits but also expressly allowed them to decline the option). 
 285 See id. at 50. 
 286 See id. at 173 n.3. 
The spirit of the clause is excellently expressed by a passage in the laws ascribed 
to David of Scotland: Acts of Parliament, vol. i. p. 318: “No man shall be judged 
by his inferior who is not his peer; the earl shall be judged by the earl, the baron 
by the baron, the vavassor by the vavassor, the burgess by the burgess; but an 
inferior may be judged by a superior.”  Some of John’s justices were certainly not 
of baronial rank.  Just at this same moment the French magnates also were striving 
for a court of peers; Luchaire, Manuel des institutions, p. 560; they did not want 
trial by jury. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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hearing of objections.287  As a result, whenever a dispute with the 
king arose, usually over land, the barons wanted to ensure that their 
disputes with the king would be settled by men of their own rank 
and status.288  By having disputes settled by individuals of similar 
socioeconomic status, the barons would be ensured a more 
thorough, fair, and reasonable judgment, as opposed to an arbitrary 
ruling by the king without any checks or balances.289 
2. A Limited Right: Green v. United States and 
Thereafter 
In the modern era, Clause 29 of the Magna Carta may no longer 
appear in the Supreme Court’s opinions concerning the right to a 
jury trial, at least in any significant way.  That is due to the general 
historical consensus that Clause 29 does not support the right to a 
jury trial, but rather to a trial in general.  The Supreme Court’s 
previous reliance on Clause 29 for historical support was based on 
the aforementioned error, and the argument is no longer viable.290  
The possibility of reference is further diminished by the fact that the 
Court itself has acknowledged the error.291 
This mistake was discussed in Green v. United States.292  Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence noted that the Magna Carta cited in 
contemporary jurisprudence is not the same Magna Carta that was 
originally created at Runnymede.293  In Green, the defendants had 
violated their surrender orders and were on trial for criminal 
contempt without a jury being present.294  Sentenced to three years 
in prison, the defendants argued that the punishment outside of the 
 
 287 See MCKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 214–17, 221–22, 441–44. 
 288 See Clark, supra note 281, at 1–3 (“The Barons in their combination against King 
John were not only anxious to protect themselves against the arbitrary power of the King 
but to fence off and prohibit the jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts of the Kingdom 
as to themselves and hence arose the much misunderstood expression in Magna Carta that 
they should be tried solely by the judgment (not a jury) of their peers.”). 
 289 See generally J. C. Holt, The Making of Magna Carta, 72 ENG. HIST. REV. 401 
(1957) (discussing the formation of the Magna Carta and the barons’ strategies in 
negotiating with the king). 
 290 See supra notes 269–289 and accompanying text. 
 291 See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 292 356 U.S. 165, 192–93 (1958). 
 293 Id. at 189. 
 294 Id. at 168. 
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presence of a jury exceeded the judge’s authority.295  Secondly, the 
defendants argued that criminal contempt hearings were among 
those with a constitutional guarantee to a jury trial.296  Frankfurter 
mentioned the Magna Carta’s involvement and addressed the 
existence of a mistake of interpretation in previous jurisprudence.297  
He further mentioned that the mistake did not undermine the century 
of case law regarding precedent.298 
The Green majority ruled that certain types of contempt, 
including the type involved in that case, were not guaranteed a jury 
trial.299  The Green court also noted that the Magna Carta’s 
influence in Supreme Court jurisprudence is not absolute.  There 
had never been a constitutional doubt of punishing for contempt 
without the intervention of the jury prior to the defendants’ 
challenge.300 
The Green decision was, however, later restricted.  In Bloom v. 
State of Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a jury 
trial for serious charges of contempt was indeed a constitutional 
violation.301  Without mentioning the Magna Carta in the opinion, 
this decision was more in line with its “judgment by the law of the 
land” principle contained in the original Great Charter’s Clause 39.  
Contempt procedures are punitive in nature with the possibility of 
arrest or imprisonment.302  Thus, Clause 29 of the Magna Carta 
(1225) is likewise invoked.303 
Despite the mistaken reliance, the Supreme Court is not likely 
to completely abandon its use of historical support when discussing 
the right to a jury trial.  To add historical importance to this right, 
the Supreme Court is more likely to cite to the long-standing 
recognition of the right in English common law than to cite the 
 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 189. 
 298 Green, 356 U.S. at 189. 
 299 Id. at 187 (“The principle that criminal contempt of court [is] not required to be 
tried by a jury under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our 
traditions.”). 
 300 Id. at 190. 
 301 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). 
 302 Criminal Contempt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 303 Magna Carta (1225), cl. 29, supra note 194, at 45. 
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language of the Magna Carta specifically.304  Even then, any 
citations to the Magna Carta or English common law are likely to 
be a quick reference without any need for elaboration, as the right 
to a jury trial is expressly set forth in the Sixth Amendment,305  
Article III of the Constitution,306  and further detailed through a 
body of case law.307 
However, the previous mistake does present an interesting 
opportunity for the future of the Magna Carta: as noted in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, a previous decision may only be overturned 
based on 1) the workability of any new rules, 2) strong reliance on 
the prior holding would lead to special hardships as a consequence 
of its overruling, 3) no related principles of law have developed so 
far that the decision’s reasoning or rationale is obsolete, and 4) the 
facts surrounding the decision have changed to such a degree that 
the decision is no longer justified.308  As noted above, the facts 
surrounding the previous Magna Carta decisions have changed.  
Thus, one of the requirements has been satisfied.309  Additionally, a 
change in the Supreme Court’s composition may prime the 
interpretation of the Magna Carta for a change in its future.310  In 
 
 304 Another possible source of reference may include the English Petition of Rights, 
art. III (1628). English and Colonial Roots, supra note 182. 
 305 “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 306 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”). 
 307 See Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 145–46 (1997) (outlining the judicially-created tests that courts 
apply when determining whether an entitlement to a jury trial exists); see also Green, 356 
U.S. at 189 (arguing, in the context of contempt, “[t]he fact that scholarship has shown 
that historical assumptions regarding the procedure for punishment of contempt of court 
were ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial 
history of federal law based on such assumptions”). 
 308 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
 309 The change being historians and the Court’s realization that there was no allusion 
to a jury trial in the Magna Carta.  See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (explaining that it is 
sufficient to say that by the time the U.S. Constitution had been written, jury trial had been 
in existence in England for several centuries although it is disputed whether the right to a 
jury trial can be traced to the Magna Carta). 
 310 With the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch was 
appointed.  Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/P7YU-E457] (last visited July 26, 2020).  
Gorsuch’s appointment is not likely to alter any historically-based jurisprudence since he 
and his predecessor share a common Constitutional view.  Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ, 
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the event that an issue regarding the Magna Carta and its protection 
of a jury trial arises, the Supreme Court already has one of the keys 
to overturning precedent.  However, the jury trial is guaranteed 
under the U.S. Constitution,311  hence insusceptible to “reform” 
without a strong challenge in court. 
In conclusion, the right to a jury is not absolute. For some cases 
there is no right for a case to be heard before a jury.  As stated in the 
Magna Carta, all people are entitled to a “lawful judgment of his 
peers.”312  The procedural protections developed through modern 
procedural rules and jurisprudence have continued to uphold and 
guarantee this foundational principle of the Great Charter.  Though 
not often directly cited with respect to an accused’s right to a jury 
trial, the principles originally codified by the Magna Carta continue 
to be upheld as foundational substantive rights to this day and are 
likely to continue to be protected and held as such well into the 
future. 
C. The Magna Carta and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
In its Eighth Amendment313  jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has relied on the Magna Carta primarily to analyze the 
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and to 
support the proposition that citizens are to be protected against 
arbitrary punishments.314  The linkage of the Eighth Amendment to 
the Magna Carta is based on the uniformity in language between the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, the English Bill of Rights, and the 
Eighth Amendment.  The specific language of the Eighth 
Amendment was drawn from Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration 
 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch [https://perma.cc/S6Q7-YPX5] (last visited 
July 26, 2020).  Likewise, moderate-conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy was replaced 
by a more conservative Justice, Brett Kavanaugh.  Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The 
Supreme Court Might Have Three Swing Justices Now, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 2, 2019), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-might-have-three-swing-justices-
now/ [https://perma.cc/WUJ2-VG3Z].  The impact on reliance upon the Magna Carta is, 
at this early point, unclear. 
 311 U.S. CONST.  amend. VI, VII. 
 312 Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 29. 
 313 The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 314 See infra Appendix C for a list of cases concerning the Eighth Amendment where 
the U.S. Supreme Court has cited to the Magna Carta. 
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of Rights,315  which stated: “excessive bail ought not to be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”  The language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights was 
an almost verbatim adoption of Article 10 of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.316  This consistency in language has, therefore, 
prompted both scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment by analyzing English history 
and interpreting the Magna Carta. 
For instance, in determining what constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court first referenced the Magna 
Carta in 1958.  In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held that the 
use of denationalization as a punishment for wartime desertion was 
“cruel and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment.317  In an opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
the Court explained that although it had not considered the meaning 
of “cruel and unusual punishment” at length, the principle it 
represents was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights 
of 1688 and dates back to the Magna Carta.318  The Court ruled that 
in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the 
punishment is to be measured by “evolving standards of 
decency.”319 
Part 1 of this section analyzes the principle that the punishment 
must be proportionate to the crime.  Part 2 examines the death 
penalty. Part 3 discusses protection against arbitrary punishment.  
Finally, Part 4 reviews protections against punitive damages. 
1. Proportionality 
In addition to the “evolving standard of decency,” the Court is 
also guided by the principle of proportionality in interpreting 
 
 315 See ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791 202 
(2011); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The 
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
287 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 316 See RUTLAND, supra note 315, at 202; Granucci, supra note 315, at 840. 
 317 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (explaining that denationalization “is a form of 
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political 
existence that was centuries in the development”). 
 318 Id. at 99–100. 
 319 Id. at 101 (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 230–238. 
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whether a fine or punishment violates the Eighth Amendment; this 
draws back to Clause 20 of the Magna Carta (1215) which states 
“For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion 
to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence 
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his 
livelihood.”320  The principle of proportionality requires that a 
punishment be proportional to the severity of the crime 
committed.321  On its face, through the repeated use of the term 
“excessive,” the language of the Eighth Amendment incorporates a 
proportionality requirement in the context of bails and fines.322  
Therefore, the Court has readily applied a proportionality analysis 
when considering the excessiveness of fines.323  However, the term 
“excessive” is not used in the Punishments Clause; instead, the 
Punishments Clause prohibits only “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”324  The Court, inconsistently, has relied on historical 
support to justify the implication of the principle of proportionality 
to the Punishments Clause.325 
In 1910, the Court held in Weems v. United States that the 
imposition of a punishment known as cadena temporal,326  for the 
crime of falsifying public records, was “cruel and unusual” within 
 
 320 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Magna Carta (1215), 
supra note 73, cl. 20. 
 321 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining that the principle of 
proportionality requires measuring “the relationship between the nature and number of 
offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the offender”); 
Browning, 492 U.S. at 293 (discussing the Magna Carta’s development of a measure of 
proportionality).  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004) (explaining that the essence of the proportionality analysis is 
about ensuring that the punishment is appropriate for the defendant and his or her crime). 
 322 See Craig S. Lerner, Does the Magna Carta Embody a Proportionality Principle?, 
25 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 271, 274 (2015). 
 323 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (holding that a fine of 
$357,144 for failing to disclose the transportation of $10,000 while attempting to leave the 
United States was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and thus violated 
the Eight Amendment). 
 324 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 325 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 578 (2005) (providing a history 
of the Eight Amendment’s origins), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) 
(relying on case law to establish the principle of proportionality). 
 326 217 U.S. 349, 364 (1910) (explaining that cadena temporal is a punishment of a 
minimum of 12 years and it requires that a prisoner always carry a chain at the ankle that 
hangs from the wrists and be employed at hard and painful labor). 
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the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.327  As support for its 
conclusion, the Supreme Court cited to the first English case to 
apply the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689.328  In 1689, the Court noted, the House of 
Lords held that the imposition of a $30,000 fine for an assault and 
battery was “excessive and exorbitant” and a violation of the Magna 
Carta.329  Additionally, the Court reasoned, “it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
the offense.”330  The Weems Court, although not explicitly, 
recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause incorporates a proportionality principle that 
dates back to the Magna Carta.331 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s indirect use of the Magna 
Carta in Weems, the Court has cited directly to the Magna Carta as 
evidence that the Eighth Amendment embodies a proportionality 
principle.  In Solem v. Helm, the Court struck down a life sentence 
for a recidivist who was convicted of uttering a no-account check 
for $100 because the punishment was not proportionate to the 
crime.332  The Court reasoned that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, such 
as whipping, but also punishments that are disproportionate to the 
crime committed.333  To support the conclusion that the Eighth 
Amendment requires proportionality, the Court explained that when 
the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of 
Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights, the Framers intended to 
adopt English principle of proportionality.334  The English principle 
of proportionality, the Solem Court explained, dated back to the 
 
 327 Id. at 382. 
 328 Id. at 371, 372, 376 (1910) (citing The Earl of Devonshire’s Case, 11 How. St. Tr. 
1353, 1354 (Parl. 1689)). 
 329 Id. at 376 (citing The Earl of Devonshire’s Case, at 1354). 
 330 Id. at 371. 
 331 But see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272–73 (1980) (rejecting the argument that the 
Weems Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to embody a proportionality principle 
because the type of punishment at issue in Weems was too extreme to analogize to 
traditional forms of imprisonment imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system). 
 332 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), overruled by Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (stating the 
Eighth amendment has no proportionality guarantee). 
 333 Id. at 284. 
 334 Id. at 285–86. 
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Magna Carta.335 
In Solem, the Court cited to Clause 20 of the Magna Carta, 
which declared, “[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, 
but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it.”336  An amercement, as the Court explained, 
was a form of fine that was the most common criminal punishment 
in the thirteenth century.337  Clause 20 of the Magna Carta thus 
required that punishments be proportional to the offense.  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that because the Eighth 
Amendment was based on the English Bill of Rights, the Eighth 
Amendment embodies a proportionality principle.338  Thus, 
although concepts of proportionality were not written into the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 8th amendment, the Court’s 
use of the English Bill of Rights and ideologies established in the 
Magna Carta have led to an interpretation of the clause as 
incorporating principles of proportionality. 
Just a few years before Solem, the Court upheld a life sentence 
for a recidivist who had been convicted of obtaining $120.75 by 
false pretenses in Rummel v. Estelle.339  In an opinion written by 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected the argument that the life 
sentence imposed by the recidivist statute was grossly 
disproportionate to the crime committed.340  Justice Powell 
 
 335 Id. at 284. 
 336 Id. at 284 n.9 (citing 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (including a translation of 
the Magna Carta)). 
 337 Id. at 284 n.8. 
 338 Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86.  The principle of proportionality may soon not just be 
restricted to the field of punishment. Recent technological advances in military technology 
will soon lead to fully autonomous weapons that would be incapable of making certain 
value judgments only humans can make.  This lack of judgment could lead to harsh results 
despite a minor beginning.  International laws about warfare use proportionality as one of 
its principles in making decisions with regard to life.  These machines “would threaten a 
target’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life.”  These technological advances should 
soon lead to a heated legal debate in both the international community and in the United 
States.  See Bonnie Docherty, The Case for a UN Ban on “Killer Robots”, PUB. RADIO 
INT’L (June 17, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-18/case-un-ban-killer-robots 
[https://perma.cc/6R3N-Y7QP] (linking to a report by the Harvard Law School 
International Rights Clinic and Human Rights Watch on banning autonomous weapons). 
 339 445 U.S. at 285. 
 340 Id. at 270–78 (distinguishing the applicability of the principle of proportionality in 
cases involving the imposition of the death penalty from cases involving the imposition of 
long sentences and concluding that the Court is less likely to conclude that cases involving 
the latter violate the principle of proportionality). 
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disagreed: in his dissenting opinion, he emphasized that the 
principle of proportionality is deeply rooted in both American and 
English constitutional law.341  As support for his assertion, Justice 
Powell cited the principle of proportionality embodied in Clause 20 
of the Magna Carta.342 
Lack of uniformity in punishment resulted in the 1987 Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (with a mandatory grid for determining a 
defendant’s sentence).343  While the Booker decision in 2005 held 
that mandatory sentences are unconstitutional, judges still must take 
the Guidelines into account when determining a person’s 
sentence.344  Booker cites to the Magna Carta.345  Moreover, many 
judges, such as Mark W. Bennett, argue that the Guidelines are too 
harsh.346  Judge Bennett uses policy disagreements to depart from 
the Guidelines and the crack-to-cocaine ratio, which he argues has 
a disproportionate racial effect.347  Although Judge Bennett never 
cites the Magna Carta, he, as with many judges, sentences 
defendants based on a proportionate scheme relative to the nature of 
the crimes.348 
Although the Court has relied on the Magna Carta as historical 
support for the proposition that the Punishments Clause requires 
proportionality, such a requirement has now been fleshed out 
 
 341 Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 342 Id. 
 343 Booker, 543 U.S. at 268 (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment where they allowed judges to enhance sentences using facts unreviewed by 
juries). 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. at 239. 
 346 See generally Mark W. Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration: A Federal Judge 
Reveals Shocking Truths About Federal Sentencing and Fleeting Hopes for Reform, 87 
UMKC L. REV. 1 (2018). 
 347 Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass 
Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 
RUTGERS L. REV 874, 876–77, 893–96 (2015). 
 348 One might even apply proportionality to the use of sentencing algorithms.  Some 
of these algorithms have been shown to produce results that may be racially biased, thus 
affecting the proportionality of the punishment to the crime.  At the same time, a “good” 
algorithm could in theory produce a perfectly proportionate punishment.  Adam Liptak, 
Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2017, § 
A, at 22 (referring to, inter alia, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017)). 
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through case law.349  The beginning of this recognition and the 
argument as to what it means in contemporary American 
jurisprudence came in Solem v. Helm; the Court established a three-
part test for courts to use in determining whether a punishment is 
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.350  The Court’s 
Solem ruling has, however, since been overruled.  In Harmelin v. 
Michigan, Justice Scalia’s opinion overruled the notion that the 
Eighth Amendment contained a guarantee of proportionality.351  
Rather than guaranteeing proportionality, the Harmelin majority 
held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment was directed at prohibiting certain methods of 
punishment.352  In furtherance of this point, the Court opined that 
the imposition of mandatory life sentences (i.e., no possibility of 
parole) without considering mitigating factors may be cruel, 
however it is not unusual in a Constitutional sense.353  The Eighth 
Amendment, as it were to follow, protected against only cruel and 
unusual punishments, not offering protection against either alone. 
Because it is now settled law that the Punishments Clause does 
not embody a proportionality principle, there is no need for the court 
to cite to the Magna Carta as support for that proposition.354  
 
 349 See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 288 (noting that “the Court has continued to recognize 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate punishments”). 
 350 See id. at 292 (“[A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment 
should be guided by objective criteria, including (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”).  But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962 (“We specifically rejected the 
proposition asserted by the dissent . . . that unconstitutional disproportionality could be 
established by weighing three factors . . . . ”). 
 351 501 U.S. at 958 (“The guarantee was directed at the arbitrary use of the sentencing 
power by the King’s Bench in particular cases and at the illegality, rather than the 
disproportionality, of punishments thereby imposed.”). 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. at 994–95 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual 
in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our 
Nation’s history.  As noted earlier, mandatory death sentences abounded in our first Penal 
Code.  They were also common in the several States—both at the time of the founding and 
throughout the 19th century.  There can be no serious contention, then, that a sentence 
which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 354 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 322, at 282–83 (explaining that recent cases have not 
cited to the Magna Carta as support for the proposition that the Punishments Clause 
embodies a proportionality principle). 
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Additionally, although the Magna Carta’s “salvo contenemento 
suo” principle presents an opportunity for use of the Magna Carta, 
courts generally do not consider a defendant’s ability to pay a 
relevant factor in an Eighth Amendment analysis concerning the 
Excessive Fines Clause.355  Use of the Magna Carta in this area is 
likely to be confined to a cursory explanation that certain rights are 
long-standing. 
It is also of note that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning the Excessive Fines Clause356  does not cite the Magna 
Carta for its “salvo contenemento suo” principle.357  Salvo 
contenemento suo literally means “saving his livelihood.”358  The 
principle requires that a defendant not be fined an amount that 
exceeds his ability to pay.359  Although there is potential for use of 
the Magna Carta in interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause, 
American courts are unlikely to rely on the Magna Carta in this area 
because a defendant’s inability to pay a fine is generally not 
relevant.360 
In a post-Scalia climate, the U.S. Supreme Court began to revert 
to its previous interpretation of the Eighth Amendment protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  Less than one month before 
Scalia’s death, the U.S. Supreme Court retroactively applied a 2012 
decision that made it unconstitutional to sentence minors to life 
 
 355 Id. 
 356 The Excessive Fines Clause states: “[N]or excessive fines imposed.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
 357 The salvo contenemento suo principle is embodied in Clause 20 of the Magna 
Carta, which states, in relevant part: “For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only 
in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but 
not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood.”   Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, 
cl. 20. 
 358 Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 836 (2013).  That can also be 
translated as “saving his land.”  JOHN F. ARCHBOLD, EDWARD CHRISTIAN & JOHN 
WILLIAMS, A TRANSLATION OF ALL THE GREEK, LATIN, ITALIAN, AND FRENCH QUOTATIONS 
WHICH OCCUR IN BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 245 (1823). 
 359 See McLean, supra note 358, at 834–35 (explaining that historical evidence 
suggests that the English Bill of Rights’ outlawing of “excessive fines” was intended to 
reaffirm the “salvo contenemento suo” principle). 
 360 But see id. at 835 (explaining that since United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113 
(1st Cir. 2007), the First Circuit, in a line of cases, has considered the defendant’s ability 
to pay a fine as a relevant factor in an Excessive Fines Clause analysis). 
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without parole for a murder conviction.361  The following year, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided that the use of outdated medical 
definitions of intellectual disability violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment.362  
Recently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez the Court denied claims that 
sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act granted detained 
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during their detention.363  
While the case was decided mostly on due process arguments, the 
dissent by Justice Breyer linked principles from the Magna Carta 
and the Eighth Amendment to the due process right to a bail hearing 
and protection from arbitrary detention.364 
In light of the most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, as well as 
with the confirmation of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh, it is likely that decisions to expand the Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will not 
soon be based on or swayed by principles of the Magna Carta.  
Decisions regarding application of the Eighth Amendment probably 
would follow the Scalia logic of only protecting against certain 
types of punishment in the near future, though the Magna Carta 
could still be referenced in dissents that may have an impact on 
future rulings.365 
 
 361 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (applying the Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) decision, the Court suggested that “[a] State may remedy a 
Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, 
rather than by resentencing them . . . Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole 
ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity – and who have 
since matured – will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment”). 
 362 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017). 
 363 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. 
 364 Id. at 859, 861 (Breyer J., dissenting). 
 365 Some states have enacted “three strikes” laws.  When a defendant is convicted of 
a third offense, then the defendant is subject to a mandatory, severe sentence, such as 25 
years to life in prison.  In reviewing California’s three strikes law, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found the laws to not be in violation of the constitutional right against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See generally Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 
538 U.S. 63 (2003).  The Court issued two 5-4 decisions on the same day, with a total of 
five opinions in Ewing and the court majority opinion and one dissent issued in Lockyer, 
yet of the six Justices who authored an opinion (Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality 
opinion in Ewing and the majority opinion in Lockyer; Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote 
opinions concurring in the judgment in Ewing; Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting 
opinions in Ewing; and Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinions for the four 
dissenters in Lockyer) not one Justice referred to the Magna Carta. 
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2. The Death Penalty 
The Magna Carta was originally written as a guarantee of 
liberties against a disliked king.366  Regardless of the rights the 
Magna Carta may provide, it is accepted that the Magna Carta was 
not originally meant to apply to the common man.367  Rather, it was 
intended to protect barons and other powerful lords in medieval 
England against monarchial overreach.368  Conversely, as recently 
as 2015, eight centuries after its inception, concepts within the 
Magna Carta were used to ensure the right of a minority of citizens 
to have their marriage recognized by the federal government and 
across state lines.369  This demonstrates the continual value and 
evolution of the Magna Carta.  Its ability to be reinterpreted 
provides it with life through the interpretation of a  
“living” U.S. Constitution. 
This also demonstrates a possible path for the Magna Carta to 
continue down.  William Blackstone stated the liberty provided in 
the Magna Carta to be “the power of locomotion, of changing 
situation . . . without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due 
course of law.”370  It appears to be an entirely procedural guarantee, 
but as seen in Obergefell, liberty can be interpreted as a much 
broader term. 
Consider one of the contemporary substantive right debates: the 
right to live.  Scholars have noted the Magna Carta’s basis in natural 
law, a body of unchanging moral principles regarded as a basis for 
all human conduct.371  Natural law influenced the 40th, 41st, and 48th 
Clauses of the Magna Carta, to name a few.372  Historically, natural 
 
 366 Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1476. 
 367 See id. at 1479. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Although the Magna Carta was only directly invoked by the dissenters, the Magna 
Carta may be seen as inspiring the wording of the very constitutional amendment which 
was held to contain the right.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 724–25 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 370 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121, *134. 
 371 Engle, supra note 228, at 490. 
 372 Richard H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Law of Nature, 62 LOY. L. REV. 869, 
879 (2016); see, e.g., Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 40 (“To no one will we sell, 
to no one deny or delay right or justice.”); id. cl. 41 (guaranteeing safe and secure passage 
to and from England for all merchants, and limiting the exaction of tax to “ancient and 
lawful customs” except in time of war”); id. cl. 48 (declaring all “evil customs” to be 
immediately investigated in each county by twelve sworn knights of the same county who 
would then abolish the evil customs, “completely and irrevocably”). 
636 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
law dominated the European continent in the early 1200s.373  This 
assertion is bolstered by the parallelisms between the clauses of the 
Magna Carta in England and other documents being written in 
Europe around the same time.374  Under contemporaneous natural 
law of the 1200s, it was accepted that there are some crimes so 
abhorrent that death was an acceptable penalty.375  Though death 
was an acceptable penalty for morally reprehensible crimes 
abhorrent to life, Clause 20 of the Magna Carta protected 
individuals against punishment disproportionate to their crimes by 
stating: “For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in 
proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence 
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his 
livelihood.”376  Natural law theory has likewise evolved since the 
1200s; the modern theory of natural law wholly proscribes death as 
a punishment.377  With the U.S. Constitution being so influenced by 
the Magna Carta,378  it is argued that to deprive someone of life is a 
violation of the natural law, and thus, against the Constitution as 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment.379  This argument is interesting for two 
reasons: 1) it would provide another use of the Magna Carta and 2) 
it demonstrates the Magna Carta’s ability to evolve. 
Since the Magna Carta was written before the new natural law, 
it must have been inspired by the original natural law.  There are no 
provisions regarding the penalty of death for a crime.  Thus, it can 
be assumed that execution was acceptable as long as the due process 
requirements were followed, and the punishment was proportional 
to the abhorrence of the crime.  Judging by the plethora of execution 
 
 373 Helmholz, supra note 372, at 873. 
 374 See id. at 872. 
 375 Edward Feser, Capital Punishment, Catholicism, and Natural Law: A Reply to 
Christopher Tollefsen, PUB. DISCOURSE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.thepublicdiscourse. 
com/2017/11/20504/ [https://perma.cc/2RBU-8EMT]; see also Magna Carta (1215), 
supra note 73, cl. 20. 
 376 Id. 
 377 Feser, supra note 375; see also Steven A. Long, God, Death, and the New Natural 
Law Theory, THOMISTICA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://thomistica.net/posts/2015/1/8/god-death-
and-the-new-natural-law-theory [https://perma.cc/F7UJ-MZCB]. 
 378 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; Engle, supra note 228, at 495. 
 379 Engle, supra note 228, at 511; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted”). 
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methods in the Middle Ages, it is clear that despite the barbarity of 
the actions, the Magna Carta originally did not take a stance against 
the death penalty.380 
The avoidance of the subject may be attributable to the low 
frequency of capital punishment in the Middle Ages.381  A second 
reason could be the vitality of capital punishment’s role. When a 
government is in early development, capital punishment is helpful 
in demonstrating state power and control over its constituents.382  
The 1200s were unstable, as demonstrated by the Barons’ rebellion 
leading up to the Magna Carta. Having the ability to demonstrate 
control through capital punishment could have been instrumental 
for King John in re-securing his role as king.383 
Recently, new natural law theory has been invoked in order to 
protect human rights nationally and internationally.384  Now, over 
800 years after its drafting, the Magna Carta is more aligned with 
the new natural law approach as opposed to the natural law that 
formerly influenced it.  As noted in Green, the Magna Carta “has 
become [something] very different indeed from the immediate 
objects of the barons at Runnymede.”385  Indeed, while some judges, 
especially Justice Hugo L. Black, have objected to a natural law 
jurisprudence as giving unfettered freedom to adopt legal standards 
based on personal notions of fairness rather than on actual legal 
texts,386  newer concepts of natural law may help introduce general 
 
 380 Execution in the Middle Ages, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.co.uk/shows/ 
britains-bloodiest-dynasty/articles/execution-in-the-middle-ages [https://perma.cc/SE8L-
VLZY] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021). 
 381 RICHARD WARD, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF EXECUTION AND THE CRIMINAL CORPSE 3 
(2015). 
 382 Id. at 11. 
 383 The 29th Clause of the 1225 Magna Carta states that a man shall not be attacked 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers.  Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 29.  
This could be a reservation that allows the King to secure his kingdom and prevent 
rebellion. 
 384 See Mark Searl, A Normative Theory of International Law Based on New Natural 
Law Theory, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., DEP’T OF L. 3 (Sept. 2014), 
https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/999/1/Searl_A_Normative_Theory_of_International_Law_Base
d_on_New_Natural_Law_Theory.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNJ2-ZCSB]. 
 385 Green, 356 U.S. at 189; see also supra Part II.B.ii (discussing Green). 
 386 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 168–69 (Black, J., concurring) (opining that due process, 
simply a notion of “fundamental fairness,” can “shift from time to time in accordance with 
judges’ predilections and understandings of what is best for the country,” that is gives 
“unconfined power . . . to judges in our Constitution that is a written one in order to limit 
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notions of procedural fairness as tied to core principles of justice, 
encompassed in the Magna Carta if not tied directly to a current, 
binding positive law such as the Constitution. 
The Magna Carta has reached far beyond the common law 
countries to impact Civil Law and mixed-law nations as well as the 
United Nations.  Consider the UDHR, which drew from the Magna 
Carta.387  The UDHR states that all people have the right to life.388  
Judging by the effect on various signatory nations, that line has been 
interpreted to disapprove of the death penalty, as 118 nations have 
abolished capital punishment since the making of the Declaration.389 
The United States has not followed this trend.390  In 1976, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty.391  
In Gregg, the Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and murder 
and sentenced to death.392  The Supreme Court of Georgia found 
 
governmental power,” and that, instead of “the particular judge’s idea of ethics,” that judge 
should decide cases based “on the boundaries fixed by the written words of the 
Constitution”); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ‘natural law’ formula which the Court uses to reach its conclusion in this case 
should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution.”). 
 387 Shami Chakrabarti, Magna Carta and Human Rights, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-human-rights 
[https://perma.cc/BH6P-96GK].  Eleanor Roosevelt called the UDHR the “international 
Magna Carta of all men everywhere.”  Karina Weller, Magna Carta: The Origin of Modern 
Human Rights, EACHOTHER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://eachother.org.uk/magna-carta-rights-
today/ [https://perma.cc/96KM-7KC6].  In 1948, the United Nations took ideas from the 
Magna Carta in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for freedom of movement, 
freedom from arbitrary arrest, and right to a trial by jury.  The chairwoman of the 
committee, Eleanor Roosevelt, hoped that the declaration would extend the protections of 
the Magna Carta around the world and would become “the international Magna Carta of 
all men everywhere.”  In 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights was ratified, 
which used Clause 29 of the Magna Carta in its documents.  Lock, supra note 16. 
 388 G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, supra note 245, art. 3. 
 389 Richard D. Vogel, The Demise of the Death Penalty in the USA: The Politics of 
Capital Punishment and the Question of Innocence, MR ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://mronline.org/2009/11/22/the-demise-of-the-death-penalty-in-the-usa-the-politics-
of-capital-punishment-and-the-question-of-innocence/ [https://perma.cc/Z278-5W8V]. 
 390 Twenty-nine states allow the death penalty as a sentence.  Fortunately, only seven 
of those states actually executed someone in 2014.  United States of America (United 
States): Death Penalty Profile, CORNELL L. SCH.: CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY 
WORLDWIDE, http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country= 
united+states+of+america#f3-1 [https://perma.cc/RV6X-XZJ2] (last updated Oct. 1, 
2020) [hereinafter U.S. Death Penalty Profile]. 
 391 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
 392 Id. at 160–61. 
2021 THE USE AND DISUSE OF THE MAGNA CARTA 639 
that there was no prejudice or arbitrary factors in making the 
sentence. Thus, capital punishment was not excessive or 
disproportionate.393  The Petitioner appealed by writ of certiorari to 
the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the death penalty was a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment as incorporated to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.394  The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the 
relationship of the death penalty with the Eighth Amendment and 
concluded that the definition of “cruel and unusual” changes with 
time.395 
Prior to their decision in Gregg, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the death penalty was in sync with modern 
international norms regarding the subject.  In Furman v. Georgia, 
the defendants were convicted of murder or rape and sentenced to 
death.396  In this instance, the Supreme Court held that the death 
penalty was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.397  Separate 
concurring opinions which referenced the Magna Carta were 
authored by both Justice Marshall398  and Justice Douglas.399  Justice 
Douglas’ concurrence noted that the language of the Eighth 
Amendment was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689’s 
prohibition of arbitrary and excessive penalties, which was inspired 
by Clause 20 of the Magna Carta.400  In Justice Marshall’s 
concurrence, he noted that it had been previously argued that the 
Magna Carta forbade torture.401 
 
 393 This applies to the murder charge.  The death sentence with respect to the armed 
robbery since in Georgia the death penalty was rarely issued for robbery charges.  Id. at 
162. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id. at 173 (affirming the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision, stating, “the 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark a 
maturing society” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)). 
 396 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
 397 Id. at 240. 
 398 Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 399 Id. at. 240 (Douglass, J., concurring). 
 400 Id. at 242–43. 
 401 Id. at 316 (describing the use of cruel and unusual punishment on both convicted 
defendants and witnesses).  With respect to these cases, the Supreme Court has not 
condemned the Death Penalty while the Court does acknowledge its permanency.  Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 187.  It has imposed some limitations.  See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 
(holding that death penalty on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional), but more must be 
done.  The frequency of executions does, however, seem to be diminishing.  In 2007, there 
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The Magna Carta can be seen as evolving to a “living” 
document.  This can create a conflict with our Constitution.402  The 
Fifth Amendment reserves a right to deprive a citizen of life as long 
as that citizen is afforded a right of due process.403  If the United 
States wishes to be recognized as a “maturing society,” its treatment 
of the death penalty should evolve in tandem with the natural law 
as has the Magna Carta; thus, the nation must recognize that the 
right to life cannot be taken away by the government, even when 
citizens are afforded due process.  This most significant challenge 
thus remains: how to meet the necessity to evolve while adhering to 
basic principles.  
A longstanding principle is that the U.S. Constitution, like the 
Magna Carta, presents for posterity a “living document” capable of 
being reinterpreted with respect to changing moral and societal 
norms.404  The living document theory is proposed as the way to 
interpret the Constitution because times change.405  Another view is 
originalism, which is the idea that the Constitution should be 
interpreted as originally written.406  Originalists look to the words 
of the text and the minds of the Founders when writing the 
Constitution.407  Originalists argue this is the way that the 
Constitution should be interpreted because 1) “it binds and limits 
any particular generation from ruling according to the passion of the 
times[,]” 2) the Founders intended to limit government, 3) it ensures 
the separation of power, like preventing the Supreme Court from 
 
were forty-two executions. In 2017, the number of executions dropped to twenty-three for 
the entire year, indicating a 50% decrease in ten years.  U.S. Death Penalty Profile, supra 
note 390. 
 402 The Framers’ acceptance of the death penalty is apparent from the text of the 
Constitution.  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.  Without maturing, the Magna Carta’s 
denouncement and the Constitution’s acceptance conflict with one another. 
 403 U.S. CONST. amend V. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law[.]”). 
 404 Thurgood Marshall, Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the 
S.F. Pat. and Trademark Law Ass’n, The Bicentennial Speech (May 6, 1987), transcript 
available at http://thurgoodmarshall.com/the-bicentennial-speech/ [https://perma.cc/66 
PE-PKP5]. 
 405 Jason Swindle, Originalism vs. “Living Document”, SWINDLE L. GRP. P.C. (Oct. 
29, 2017), https://www.swindlelaw.com/2017/10/originalism-living-constitution-
heritage/ [https://perma.cc/8CTV-KER8]. 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id. 
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creating law, 4) the Founders understood humans have self-
motivated impulses, so the Constitution tries to limit those impulses 
while allowing amendment, and 5) originalism is not result-
oriented.408  Under originalism, the death penalty is not a valid form 
of punishment because it is not expressly in the Constitution. In fact, 
the living document theory of the Constitution is the more popular 
theory for interpreting this theory.409 
The flexibility of the U.S. Constitution has been demonstrated 
by providing protection to historically oppressed groups through the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.410  For instance, not only was slavery legal 
at the inception of the U.S. Constitution, slaves were counted as 
only three-fifths of a whole person for the purpose of census-taking 
while Native Americans were wholly ignored.411  It is through the 
evolving interpretation of the Constitution’s words in parallel with 
the evolution of the natural law, as well as by incorporation of its 
protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
these same classes were afforded the same rights and protection.412 
The basis for this argument about a progressing explanation of 
key constitutional concepts could come from the Great Charter’s 
omission of the death penalty, as it only provided the king with the 
ability to disseize freeholds, liberties, and customs.  In other words, 
the Constitution should be amended to state that there is a right to 
impose the death penalty because without that provision the United 
States is carrying out a “right” not stated in the Constitution.  This 
could serve as a foundation for the Supreme Court to show that the 
previous interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is incongruent with 
the new interpretation of the Magna Carta, focusing specifically on 
 
 408 Id. 
 409 See id. 
 410 Mark Charles, What if We Struck Racism and Sexism from the Constitution of the 
United States, Actually Abolished Slavery, and Added 2 Simple Words Articulating Value 
for Life?, WIRELESSHOGAN, (May 9, 2017)  https://wirelesshogan.com/2017/05/09/what-
if-we-struck-racism-and-sexism-from-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/3AUM-AZZT]. 
 411 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians 
not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”). 
 412 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ruling 
separate is not equal). 
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a new definition of “life.”  That approach is required as the United 
States continues to create necessary human rights. Indeed, the entire 
point of both the Magna Carta and the Fifth Amendment is that the 
rights have existed since “time immemorial.”413  It is not the 
government that creates or grants these rights; rather, their 
incorporation into these documents confirms rights that are 
“endowed by the creator” and not able to be taken by the 
government. 
3. Protection Against Arbitrary Punishment 
In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion 
cited to the Magna Carta to support the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment was intended to protect against arbitrary and 
discriminatory punishments.414  In Furman, the Court concluded 
that imposing and carrying out the death penalty would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.415  Justice Douglas explained: “[T]he 
provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the 
language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned 
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties 
and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties 
of a severe nature.”416 
To support the proposition that one of the aims of the English 
Bill of Rights was to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory 
punishments, Justice Douglas cited to the Magna Carta;417  he 
explained that following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, 
the old system of penalties was replaced by a system that imposed 
discretionary amercements.418  Although the system allowed the 
particular circumstances of each case to be considered when 
arriving at an amount to fine the defendant, arbitrary and excessive 
amercements became prevalent.419  As a result, three clauses of the 
Magna Carta of 1215 were devoted to protecting against arbitrary 
 
 413 See supra Part I.A (noting that the Magna Carta did not create substantive rights, 
but affirmed and codified rights present since “time immemorial”). 
 414 408 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 415 Id. at 239–40. 
 416 Id. at 241. 
 417 Id. at 243. 
 418 Id. at 242–43. 
 419 Id. at 243. 
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and excessive punishments.420  Against this backdrop, Justice 
Douglas concluded, the English Bill of Rights, from which the 
Eighth Amendment was modeled after, was created.421  As such, the 
same protection against arbitrary and excessive punishments 
survived. 
4. Protection Against Punitive Damages 
While not commonly granted,422  punitive damages are another 
area of punishments protected by the Magna Carta.  Punitive 
damages are compensation paid by the losing party in order to 
discourage the losing party’s behavior in society.423  The principle 
of proportionality is invoked because punitive damages should be 
calculated in proportion to the losing party’s wrongdoing.424 
Today, the Great Charter serves as protection against arbitrary 
damages as it did against amercements in the era of King John.425  
Both amercements and punitive damages serve as punishment for 
wrongdoing.  The Magna Carta does not prohibit punitive damages 
from being awarded, despite few clear ways of determining what 
 
 420 Furman, 408 U.S. at 243–45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The problem of 
excessive amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta were 
devoted to their regulation. . . . The words ‘cruel and unusual’ certainly include penalties 
that are barbaric.  But the words, at least when read in light of the English proscription 
against selective and irregular use of penalties, suggest that it is ‘cruel and unusual’ to 
apply the death penalty - or any other penalty - selectively to minorities whose numbers 
are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing 
to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty 
across the board.”); Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 20, 21, 22.  The protection 
continued into subsequent editions of the Magna Carta. Magna Carta (1225), supra note 
194, cl. 14. 
 421 Furman, 408 U.S. at 242–43. 
 422 Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages: Rare, Reasonable, and Limited (2011), CTR. FOR 
JUST. DEMOCRACY AT N.Y. L. SCH., https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-punitive-
damages-rare-reasonable-and-limited-2011 [https://perma.cc/A8FH-22XN] (last updated 
Apr. 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages]. 
 423 James F. Ferrelli & Trevor H. Taniguchi, Roots of New Jersey Punitive Damages 
Law in Magna Carta, 294 N.J. LAW. MAG. 36, 36 (2015). 
 424 Id. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 425 Generally, the Great Charter continues to be invoked, in any number of common 
law countries, for its prohibition of any number of arbitrary governmental actions.  In 
Australia and New Zealand, for example, the Magna Carta is considered when deciding 
the following: sentencing principles, the right to trial according to law, a prohibition on 
arbitrary detention, and the foundation of prohibitions against cruel or unusual 
punishments.  Clark, supra note 176, at 875. 
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the financial equivalent of a “punishment” is.426  As noted in statutes 
and in the common law, punitive damages are only required to be 
proportional.427  In a more radical sense, it could be argued that the 
Magna Carta protects the granting of punitive damages when such 
a grant is not in proportion to the offense. 
Under the Civil Law system, which generally has not adopted 
the Magna Carta, punitive damages are very unlikely to be 
awarded.428  On the other hand, almost all common law countries 
which have adopted the Magna Carta in some form allow punitive 
damages to harmed litigants.429  In fact, in the United States, some 
states have used the Magna Carta to craft punitive damage 
statutes.430  Internationally, New Zealand, a country with roots in 
the Magna Carta,431  allows entire cases based solely on punitive 
damages.432 
Unfortunately, with the slow decline in the awarding of punitive 
 
 426 Punitive damages were awarded during the time of the Magna Carta.  Mimi B. 
Miller, Torts – Punitive Damages: A New Finish on Punitive Damages. BMW of North 
America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 519, 523 (1997) 
(noting that English common law has been using punitive damages since the thirteenth 
century). 
 427 Ferrelli & Taniguchi, supra note 423, at 36.  Note, however, not all jurisdictions 
require proportionality.  Some states only set maximum caps.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
55-208 (2003) (declared unconstitutional by Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 385 
S.W.3d 822 (Ark. 2011)). 
 428 ROBERT W. EMERSON, BUSINESS LAW 477 (6th ed. 2015) (stating that a large 
majority of Civil Law countries do not permit the awarding of punitive damages).  The 
purpose of this Article is not to identify why Civil law nations have chosen to adopt “moral 
damages” as opposed to “punitive damages.”  It could be attributed to the “end goal.” 
 429 Id. 
 430 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (2006) (“[T]he trial judge shall ascertain that 
the award is reasonable in its amount and justified in the circumstances of the case.”). 
 431 When New Zealand was incorporated into the British Empire, the native 
inhabitants of New Zealand were provided with the same rights as British Englishmen.  
STEPHEN LEVINE, NEW ZEALAND AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 42 (2006).  In fact, the Magna 
Carta’s imprint can be seen in the adopting legislation of both independent Australia and 
New Zealand; thus, in statutes enacted from 1969 to 1998, the Magna Carta’s preamble 
and Clause 29 appear in the Imperial Acts Application Ordinances of several Australian 
states (Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory) and 
of the New Zealand national government.  Clark, supra note 176. 
 432 New Zealand Legal Environment – A Summary of the Major Differences Between 
the New Zealand Legal System and Other Legal Systems., WILSON HARLE, 
https://www.wilsonharle.com/legal-information/nz-legal-guides/new-zealand-legal-
environment [https://perma.cc/Y2TY-YPLV] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (noting that 
English law serves as the source of awarding punitive damages New Zealand). 
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damages, this may not be a necessary path for the Great Charter to 
continue.433  In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that excessive 
punitive damages are takings of property without due process.434  
Along these lines, substantive due process may justify denial or 
diminution of punitive damages when a losing party has personal 
circumstances preventing such a large payment.  Sometimes, when 
an excessive fine is imposed, a defendant may feel compelled to 
declare bankruptcy,435  thus resulting in the plaintiff’s getting less 
than the plaintiff may have received if a more “reasonable” damages 
award had been imposed.436  Nonetheless, the Great Charter may 
continue to protect defendants from excessive punitive damages, 
regardless of whether the wrongful act causes physical harm or 
harm that is less tangible or visible.  A recent example of this 
protection offered to Defendants is found in Payne v. Jones.  In 
Payne, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
interestingly ruled that $300,000 was excessive punitive damages in 
an excessive force and battery claim committed by a police 
officer.437  The English Bill of Rights,438  in some states’ Declaration 
 
 433 There was a decrease in the recovery of punitive damages from 2001 to 2005.  Fact 
Sheet: Punitive Damages, supra note 422.  But see Daniel M. Braun, The Risky Interplay 
of Tort and Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
449, 449–50 (2013) (claiming the size of punitive damage awards has increased). 
 434 Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). 
 435 While awards based on fraud or other intentional wrongdoing ordinarily are not 
dischargeable, punitive damages may be discharged, depending on the underlying facts.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reiterated in TKC Aerospace 
Inc. v. Muhs, 923 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 607 (2019), that such 
debts may be dischargeable if the debtor did not intend to cause injury.  Thus remains 
strong the longstanding principle expressed in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998), 
that a bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires “a deliberate or 
intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”  
Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61. 
 436 In bankruptcy, for example, when a judgment debtor is able to discharge some of 
that debt, the plaintiff creditor may get paid in “bankruptcy dollars,” perhaps just pennies 
on the dollar. 
 437 711 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2013) (recounting that the defendant police officer 
verbally agitated and repeatedly punched the plaintiff war veteran, who was being admitted 
into a mental hospital after experiencing a post-traumatic stress disorder episode at another 
hospital). 
 438 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown 1689, 1 & 2 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.), available at English Bill of 
Rights, 1689, an Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), U. OF MINN. HUM. RTS LIBR., 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/education/engbillofrights.html [https://perma.cc/3F62-F3D5] 
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of Rights439  as well as the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment,440  reaffirms the Magna Carta’s idea of no excessive 
bail or fines. 
Consider Clause 14 (1225) of the Magna Carta: “A free man 
shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the 
fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him 
his contenement . . . .”441  In other words, the “Magna Carta required 
that economic sanctions ‘be proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be 
so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood.’”442  It creates 
a proportionality requirement that has been demonstrated in most 
Supreme Court decisions.443  In most instances, punitive damages 
are awarded for grave offenses.444  The Great Charter has no 
requirement that the offense requiring due process occur in the civil 
or criminal prosecution, therefore it should be applicable to punitive 
damages that arise in either situation.445 
The Supreme Court has already determined that civil suit 
punitive damages are not restricted by the Excessive Fines Clause, 
so a civil defendant cannot rely solely on constitutional protection 
from arbitrary punitive damages.  Browning-Ferris Industries held 
that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply in civil cases,446  but 
this could change.  At the very least, a reasoned, nuanced judgment 
 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
 439 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019). 
 440 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 441 Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 14. 
 442 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning, 492 U.S. at 
271).  Finding the Excessive Fines Clause to be an incorporated protection applicable to 
the states under the Due Process Clause, the Court held that the safeguard “is ‘fundamental 
to our scheme of ordered liberty,’ with ‘dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and tradition.’”  Id. 
at 686–87 (alterations in original) (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767). 
 443 See supra Part II.C.i. 
 444 Punitive Damages, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/punitive_ 
damages [https://perma.cc/9PXY-987J] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
 445 By the lack of a restriction, the Magna Carta may protect defendants where the 
Excessive Fines Clause may not.  See Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court 
(Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 532 (2011) (noting 
that punitive damages are outside of the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 446 Browning, 492 U.S. at 263–64 (1989) (“[W]e now decide [that the Excessive Fines 
Clause] does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government 
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages 
awarded.”). 
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may take hold.  Some lower courts have imposed a proportionality 
test to determine if the award of punitive damages is proportional.447  
In response, defendants could invoke the venerable, jurisprudential 
architecture of the Magna Carta and its requirement that there be 
proportional payment for grave or trivial offenses.  With its central 
place in the Anglo-American legal firmament, the Magna Carta may 
show a clearer path of how punitive damages can be fairly awarded. 
Some courts seem to have even created an informal formula for 
determining whether punitive damages are excessive.  Two years 
after Payne, the Tenth Circuit reduced the punitive damages 
awarded to the plaintiff apartment tenant, who was exposed to 
carbon monoxide, from $22 million to $1.95 million to reflect a 1:1 
ratio to the compensatory damages the jury awarded the plaintiff.448  
However, there have been instances where courts have extended the 
ratio to 2:1 when it is found that the defendant’s conduct was 
egregious or intentional.449 
By requiring a defendant’s personal circumstances to be 
considered, the Magna Carta can continue serving a purpose 
through its “salvo contenemento suo” principle.  An individual’s 
inability to pay may deprive him or her of the necessary enjoyment 
of life and liberty.450  Studies have demonstrated that, in the criminal 
arena, economic sanctions have some extremely harsh results.451 
The Magna Carta has already influenced legislation in providing 
a reasonableness requirement on the amount of punitive damages 
that may be awarded.  Some states have employed a reasonableness 
standard, while others weigh the defendant’s financial situation.452  
 
 447 See In re Actos Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299, 2014 WL 5461859, at *15–
23 (W. D. La. Oct. 27, 2014); Hawks v. Greene, No. M1999-02785-COA-R3-CV, 2001 
WL 1613889, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001); United States v. One Parcel Prop. 
Located at 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 448 Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 1076 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that because the amount of compensatory damages was so substantial, the 
equal amount awarded as punitive damages would represent the maximum amount that 
due process would allow). 
 449 Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
2:1 ratio is appropriate where defendants subjected the plaintiff to “an extraordinary and 
steadily intensifying drumbeat of racial insults, intimidation, and degradation over a period 
of more than three years”). 
 450 Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 281 
(2014). 
 451 Id. at 290–95. 
 452 MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(6), (7) (1998). 
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These latter ruminations may be vital if one is to shelter a 
defendant’s lifestyle and livelihood, while still discouraging that 
defendant’s inappropriate or outright wrongful behavior.  For 
example, if Smith and Jones are both defendants for lawsuits based 
upon allegedly reckless driving, but Smith has no disposable 
income, a punitive award may strip away Smith’s way of life while 
leaving Jones in an increasingly superior financial situation 
compared to Smith. 
The main purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter 
similar conduct.  In the United States, punishment is normally 
handled by the criminal justice system.  There is not typically a 
necessity for it to bleed into civil law and remove distinctions 
between tort and criminal law.453  As punitive damages continue to 
increase in size or at least possibilities of an award, the U.S. 
Supreme Court must intervene to allow for consideration of an 
individual’s financial circumstances.  Recently, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana upheld a $20 billion 
settlement for British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 
which included the imposition of punitive damages.454  To wrest 
punitive damages from defendants necessitated that courts consider 
the resources of British Petroleum, the ability of the corporation to 
pay the fines as well as continue functioning, and the deterrent value 
of such an imposition.455  In the future, it appears highly likely that 
in the civil arena large corporations will still face the risk of punitive 
damages when committing gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Magna Carta, as enacted at Runnymede, affirmed liberties 
that had existed “since times immemorial”456  but had heretofore 
 
 453 Braun, supra note 433, at 453. 
 454 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 757 (E.D 
La. 2014); see Devin Henry, Judge Approves $20B BP Oil Spill Settlement, THE HILL (Apr. 
4, 2016), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/275100-judge-approves-20b-
settlement-over-bp-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/R8BU-W6MV]. 
 455 Id. at 751 (“The Ninth Circuit’s maritime rule follows the Restatement, which 
allows punitive damages against the corporate entity when the actor was in a ‘managerial 
capacity’ and performing within the scope of his employment. . . . The First Circuit 
appears to also use the managerial agent theory, but with the added requirement that there 
be ‘some level of [corporate] culpability for the misconduct.’  The Court finds that punitive 
liability would attach to BPXP under this standard as well.”). 
 456 See discussion supra Part I. 
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been indefinite and uncodified.  Although the Magna Carta fell into 
disuse throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, continued 
invocation of the Magna Carta on solemn occasions helped provide 
a luster that it retains to this day.  Judge Coke initiated the Magna 
Carta’s renaissance in the early seventeenth century, as he 
effectively used the Charter to place the legislative power of 
Parliament beyond monarchical authority as well as within the 
foundational common law.457 
When England established its first American colony in the same 
time frame (the seventeenth century), the English brought with them 
the traditions of the Magna Carta and the common law.458  The 
common law traditions inspired the early Americans to codify the 
Magna Carta’s guarantees in their statutes, state constitutions, and 
the U.S. Constitution.  Therefore, the time of the Magna Carta and 
early English common law is of particular relevance to courts 
analyzing the original meaning of rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.  Accordingly, the Court has analyzed the meaning of 
“due process” by analyzing the meaning of the Magna Carta’s “law 
of the land” provision,459  the meaning of “life, liberty, and 
property” by looking to what rights have been historically protected 
by the Magna Carta,460  the right to a jury trial by looking at the 
meaning of “lawful judgment of his peers,”461  and the meaning of 
“cruel and unusual punishment” by looking at English common law 
and Clause 20’s prohibition of excessiveness in the context of 
amercements.462 
These uses have expanded the fundamental liberties upon which 
American jurisprudence is based.  As evidenced by the large 
number of cases under Appendix A discussing due process463  when 
compared to the relatively few cases discussing jury trials and cruel 
 
 457 Id. 
 458 Id. 
 459 See discussion supra Part II.A.i. 
 460 See discussion supra Part II.A.ii. 
 461 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 462 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 463 There have been twenty-one majority opinions discussing due process and the 
Magna Carta, and twenty-three other opinions likewise featuring the Magna Carta in a 
non-majority opinion such as concurrences or dissents.  See infra Appendix A. 
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and unusual punishment in Appendices B464  and C,465  the Magna 
Carta’s capacity to further define American liberties may lie not 
simply with due process, but with the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments.  The Magna Carta will continue to play a quieter and 
perhaps undefined role as a foundation to rights and liberties 
protected by the U.S. Constitution.  While the Magna Carta may see 
its direct citations decrease,466  the principles contained in the Great 
Charter may continue to inspire our understanding and 
interpretation of foundational rights. 
Regardless of whether the U.S. Supreme Court will continue 
alluding to the Magna Carta on any particular issue, the Great 
Charter is by no means finished with demonstrating its value.467  
Instead, the Magna Carta will simply transition into a different role.  
It can once again be characterized as a restriction on the executive 
power of a country, like how it was used to restrict the authority of 
King John in 1215.   But there is much more to see and consider 
than an allusion between the rule of a medieval king and a modern 
U.S. President.  The U.S. Supreme Court could use the Magna Carta 
in the future to produce a modern justice that is, nonetheless, nearer 
to both (1) the earlier document’s words and its interpretation in 
subsequent centuries, such as by the great Sir Edward Coke, and (2) 
the U.S. Constitution’s text as well as its framers’ intent.  The 
Magna Carta as the people’s protection against a despotic English 
monarchy in both the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as 
in service to Coke’s rebellion against the Stuarts in the seventeenth 
century, remains a useful tool for twenty-first century U.S. common 
law and constitutional jurisprudence. 
It is worth noting the Magna Carta’s use in efforts against the 
 
 464 There have been eleven majority opinions discussing the right to jury trial and the 
Magna Carta, and ten other opinions, mainly dissents, likewise featuring the Magna Carta.  
See infra Appendix B. 
 465 There have been six majority opinions discussing cruel and unusual punishment 
as well as the Magna Carta, with eight other opinions – seven dissents and one concurrence 
– similarly featuring the Magna Carta.  See infra Appendix C. 
 466 Presently, it is exactly the opposite: the number of citations to the Great Charter of 
1215 is, if anything, on the rise in U.S. federal and state courts.  See supra notes 30–34 
and accompanying text; infra Appendices A, B, and C (showing that U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions discussing the Magna Carta and due process, jury trial, or cruel and unusual 
punishment have increased dramatically since the 1960s). 
 467 Outside of creating substantive rights, the Magna Carta may continue to be used 
by the Supreme Court for statutory construction.  See Helmholz, supra note 372, at 886. 
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“War on Terror” over a decade ago.  There, we see that the Magna 
Carta may revert from a “source of rights” into a “restraint on the 
government.”  Indeed, due process must be granted. Consider the 
cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a “War on Terror” case in which the 
Magna Carta was acknowledged in the concurrence.468  Justice 
Souter believed that the Magna Carta’s protection fell short with 
respect to Hamdi’s right of Habeas Corpus.469  Though the focus on 
the War on Terror has declined, the Supreme Court may continue to 
use the Magna Carta in guaranteeing a trial for an unpopular 
defendant.  In the early 2000s, it was terrorists or enemy 
combatants.  Perhaps, in the future, the Magna Carta can be used to 
protect the jury trial rights of alleged domestic terrorists. 
As noted in Harmelin v. Michigan, there is no proportionality 
guarantee in the Eighth Amendment.  Thus, with respect to 
punishments, the future of the Supreme Court is limited on this 
front.  However, the Magna Carta may still be of influence with 
regards to excessive fines. After Bajakajian, lower courts were still 
left confused on determining 1) whether a certain punishment was 
“cruel” and 2) whether the punishment was unconstitutional given 
the crime.470  The Magna Carta may continue to be of use by 
connecting U.S. common law to the English case law that provides 
those sorts of measurements. 
Secondly, Harmelin did not restrict the Magna Carta’s link 
between the penalty and the circumstances of the offender.471  The 
Magna Carta may continue to demonstrate its value by protecting 
an offender in a situation in which the amount of punitive damages 
is not proportioned according to the person’s circumstances.  
Whether the offender’s circumstances may be considered in 
deciding if a punishment is constitutional was expressly reserved in 
Bajakajian.472 
Lastly, the Magna Carta may provide a way forward for 
reevaluating the death penalty, punitive damages, and jury trials.  It 
may even provide guidance to newly evolving frontiers such as 
internet protection and access to needed products such as drugs.  In 
 
 468 Kasper, supra note 86, at 569. 
 469 Id. 
 470 McLean, supra note 358, at 845. 
 471 Id. at 836 (noting two constitutional principles come from the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eight Amendment). 
 472 Id. at 847. 
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Raich v. Gonzalez,473  for example, the court heard the issue of a 
fundamental right of access to unapproved products.  The appellate 
court analyzed the asserted right by asking whether it was deeply 
rooted in our nation’s history: 
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal 
judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those 
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal 
interference by the express provisions of the first eight 
Amendments to the Constitution. But of course, this Court has 
never accepted that view.474 
While the United States continues to mature, the Magna Carta, 
with its age and influence, remains a highly valuable interpretive 
tool, if not an imperative.  Though the future of the Great Charter is 
not secure for all matters, its presence in the courtroom will continue 
to determine paramount legal questions.  The Magna Carta is not 
only to be invoked for historical purposes, but it can serve a 
functional role: to keep playing a part in identifying fundamental 
rights.  History is, indeed, a very important aspect of finding 
fundamental rights.  With that in mind, we see the ability of a 
venerable but also vibrant Magna Carta to influence the declaration 
or expansion of a set of fundamental, modern rights. 
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 473 500 F.3d 850, 857 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 474 Id. at 862 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). 
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Appendix B: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions on Right to Jury 
Trial Citing the Magna Carta 
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and trial by jury 
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Appendix C: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions About Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment that Cite to the Magna Carta 
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